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Summary Table 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -6.9 -0.8 -2.7 -2.0 -0.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure -4.5 -3.8 -3.7 -2.3 -2.2 
Investment -28.7 -24.9 -10.6 -2.7 4.3 
Exports -4.2 6.3 4.1 3.3 3.5 
Imports -9.3 2.7 -0.7 0.9 2.6 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -7.0 -0.4 0.7 0.6 2.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) -9.8 0.3 -2.5 0.0 0.5 
      Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -4.5 -1.0 2.6 1.7 1.5 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 -1.5 -0.2 0.5 0.5 
      Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,929 1,848 1,810 1,797 1,792 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 259 292 304 315 308 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.8 13.6 14.4 14.9 14.7 
      Public Finance      
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -24.6 -18.7 -24.9 -16.0 -14.4 
General Government Balance (€bn) -22.5 -48.6 -20.5 -13.3 -12.5 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -14.0 -31.2 -13.1 -8.3 -7.5 
General Government Debt, % of GDP 65 93 108 115 121 
      External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -4.7 0.8 0.1 4.7 5.0 
Current Account (% of GNP) -3.6 0.6 0.1 3.7 3.8 
 
Note: Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary 
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Summary 
 
As at the time of the last Commentary, uncertainties in the eurozone remain and, 
despite progress made domestically in terms of fiscal consolidation, financial 
sector reforms and a reversal of competitiveness losses, the scale of the 
challenges facing the monetary union have the potential to suppress any 
significant Irish recovery further into the future. In addition, subdued growth in 
the UK also signals difficulties for immediate growth prospects. Recovery in 
Ireland in the near term remains tied to developments elsewhere. Current 
forecasts for the eurozone economy predict a recovery in the second half of this 
year and into next year.  
 
With domestic demand still expected to act as a drag on the economy in 2012, 
albeit a moderating one, the external sector is again likely to be the principal 
factor determining growth in the Irish economy. As a result of external 
weaknesses and increased uncertainty relating to the international environment, 
growth forecasts for this year have been revised downwards modestly. GNP 
growth is expected to be flat and GDP is expected to rise by 0.6 per cent. Turning 
to 2013, increased export volumes following the predicted recovery in the 
eurozone and the impact on exports of new firms, and a less negative domestic 
environment are expected to aid growth, with GNP likely to improve slightly, 
increasing by 0.5 per cent, while GDP is expected to expand by 2.2 per cent.  
 
Household consumption is expected to weaken further in 2012 and 2013 as 
disposable incomes continue to decline, albeit at a moderating rate. New insights 
from the CSO's Household Budget Survey also indicate that private consumption 
spending may not benefit from a rapid expansion as the extent of precautionary 
savings may well be less than previously thought.  
 
In terms of public finances, despite some rigidity in current expenditure, we 
expect that the EU/IMF programme targets will be met comfortably for this year. 
Targets for 2013 will prove more challenging, however, even with stronger 
economic growth. Unemployment in the Irish labour market remains at high 
levels and the growing share of those in long term unemployment is a serious and 
on-going concern. Emigration levels, particularly amongst young Irish, are 
expected to limit the impact of falling employment on the unemployment rate 
over the next two years. Employment opportunities should improve in 2013 as 
economic growth picks up. 
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National Accounts 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.6 81.1 -1.8 1.0 -2.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.2 25.1 -4.2 -0.6 -3.7 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.1 15.9 -11.9 -1.5 -10.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 157.7 165.3 4.8 0.7 4.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.9 0.5 
   Final Demand 283.7 288.0 1.5 0.6 0.8 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 127.9 131.7 3.0 3.7 -0.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
   GDP at Market Prices 156.0 156.5 0.3 -0.4 0.7 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27.8 -32.6 
   GNP at Market Prices 128.2 123.9 -3.4 -0.9 -2.5 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 2.7 3.0 0.3 9.8 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.8 69.0 0.2 0.3 
Other 53.2 53.0 -0.1 -0.2 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 0.2 0.4 -200.2 
Net Domestic Product 124.2 124.9 0.7 0.6 
Net Factor Payments -27.8 -32.6 -4.8 17.3 
National Income 96.4 92.3 -4.1 -4.2 
Depreciation 16.2 15.2 -1.0 -6.3 
GNP at Factor Cost 112.6 107.5 -5.1 -4.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.6 16.4 0.8 5.0 
GNP at Market Prices 128.2 123.9 -4.3 -3.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 29.4 33.2 4 
F -27.8 -32.6 -5 
Net Transfers -1.2 -0.9 0 
Balance on Current Account 0.8 0.1 -1 
as % of GNP 0.6 0.1 -0.6 
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National Accounts 2012 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.1 80.7 -0.5 1.5 -2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.1 24.8 -1.2 1.1 -2.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 15.9 15.5 -2.8 -0.1 -2.7 
Exports of Goods and Services 165.3 175.3 6.1 2.7 3.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.5 -0.1 
   Final Demand 288.0 296.2 2.9 2.1 0.7 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 131.7 136.0 3.3 2.4 0.9 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
   GDP at Market Prices 156.5 160.4 2.5 1.9 0.6 
Net Factor Payments (F) -32.6 -33.5 
   GNP at Market Prices 123.9 126.9 2.4 2.4 0.0 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 3.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 69.0 68.9 -0.1 -0.2 
Other 53.0 57.3 4.2 8.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2 0.0 19.6 
Net Domestic Product 124.9 128.7 3.8 3.1 
Net Factor Payments -32.6 -33.5 -1.0 3.0 
National Income 92.3 95.2 2.9 3.1 
Depreciation 15.2 15.2 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 107.5 110.4 2.9 2.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.4 16.5 0.1 0.6 
GNP at Market Prices 123.9 126.9 2.9 2.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 33.2 38.9 5.7 
F -32.6 -33.5 -1.0 
Net Transfers -0.9 -1.1 -0.2 
Balance on Current Account 0.1 4.7 4.5 
as % of GNP 0.1 3.7 3.5 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 80.7 81.6 1.1 1.6 -0.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24.8 24.6 -0.9 1.3 -2.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 15.5 16.2 4.4 0.1 4.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 175.3 183.7 4.8 1.3 3.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 1.0 
   Final Demand 296.2 307.1 3.7 1.3 2.3 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 136.0 141.0 3.7 1.0 2.6 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
   GDP at Market Prices 160.4 166.3 3.7 1.5 2.2 
Net Factor Payments (F) -33.5 -36.5 
   GNP at Market Prices 126.9 129.7 2.3 1.8 0.5 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.1 3.2 0.1 4.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.9 69.0 0.1 0.2 
Other 57.3 61.3 4.1 7.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Net Domestic Product 128.7 133.0 4.3 3.4 
Net Factor Payments -33.5 -36.5 -3.0 8.9 
National Income 95.2 96.5 1.3 1.4 
Depreciation 15.2 15.2 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 110.4 111.7 1.3 1.2 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.5 18.0 1.5 9.4 
GNP at Market Prices 126.9 129.7 2.9 2.3 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 39 42 3.4 
F -34 -37 -3.0 
Net Transfers -1 -1 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 4.7 5.0 0.3 
as % of GNP 3.7 3.8 0.2 
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Introduction 
 
Ireland is a small very open economy. The structure of the sections in the 
Quarterly Economic Commentary reflects the importance of the international 
economy to exports and investment as the main drivers of sustainable growth 
and potential recovery. 
 
The International Economy1 
The international economy is marked by very large differences in performance. At 
one level the two big emerging economies of Asia: China and India, are 
experiencing substantial growth as convergence and good domestic policy 
together have produced impressive economic growth. While Japan is now 
experiencing faster growth, partly due to reconstruction expenditure, the 
overhang of the fiscal and banking crisis of the past two decades remains a 
significant drag on its economy. 
 
The US economy is in recovery, but as we have noted in earlier Commentaries, 
the recovery has been muted, given the large costs of the financial sector 
recapitalisation. There are initial signs, notably in private investment, that the 
recovery may have moved beyond the fiscal stimulus and the economy may be 
moving towards faster growth. Much depends on maintaining the present fiscal 
stance, allowing the public finances to improve as the economy grows rather than 
eliminating special measures introduced to mitigate the worst effects of the 
recession. As it stands, public expenditure on goods and services, both current 
and capital, will fall this year, but remain relatively unchanged in 2013. Private 
non-residential investment grew rapidly in 2011; its growth has moderated this 
year but current forecasts indicate a faster increase again in 2013. 
Unemployment has continued to fall, albeit more moderately than had been 
expected, from the peak level experienced in 2010.  
 
GDP in the UK fell in the final quarter of 2011 and again in the first quarter of this 
year. The UK government strategy has been to correct the fiscal imbalances in the 
hope that a fiscal contraction which leads to a reduction in domestic demand 
would result in switching from the domestic market to overseas markets, with 
reasonable growth expected to follow. The weakness in the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 This section depends very heavily on the OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012 
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economy, most particularly in the eurozone, has made it difficult to realise this 
objective. The UK government is determined to meet its fiscal target, though 
there is some debate about whether in the current situation it would be better to 
alter the pace of adjustment. Monetary policy has maintained relatively low 
interest rates to support the economy and open-market operations (quantitative 
easing) have continued to provide liquidity to financial markets and to maintain a 
competitive exchange rate. Current forecasts for the UK economy expect a 
recovery in the second half of this year - partly driven by the impact of lower 
inflation on real incomes and consumption, and by increased exports if the 
eurozone economy picks up. 
 
The eurozone economy remains weak. Output fell in the final quarter of 2011 and 
early estimates for the first quarter (data from some countries were not yet 
available) indicate no growth. Leading indicators suggest a poor second quarter. 
There is still uncertainty about the continuance of the eurozone as presently 
constituted. The fundamental problems of generally poor fiscal numbers, large 
public and private debt levels, inadequate bank capital, a non-functioning inter-
bank market, and a central bank that appears unwilling to countenance further 
non-traditional approaches to the crisis remain. In these circumstances it is 
difficult to see any recovery. Yet in spite of this most forecasts expect a second 
half recovery, though this recovery is likely to be very slow with GDP at end 2012 
only marginally above that of end 2011. Underlying all forecasts is an assumed 
return of confidence followed by increased private sector activity with a 
background of increased external demand. It is unclear how improved confidence 
is expected to appear. One view is that sticking to budget targets will increase 
private sector confidence, yet the very act of fiscal consolidation will restrict 
domestic demand and weaken the investment incentive over the period of 
adjustment. Nor is it obvious where external demand is coming from. Most trade 
of the eurozone is within the eurozone itself. Nevertheless, it is mistaken to 
consider the eurozone as a block as there are significant differences in economic 
performance across individual members and, unlike the situation in a single 
country, there are no internal transfers from good performing areas to poor 
performing areas. Even if eurozone GDP does recover in the second half of this 
year, growth forecasts for 2013 remain very modest at about 1 per cent. 
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2 
 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
Preliminary data for 2011 indicate that Irish exports of goods and services 
increased by 4.1 per cent in volume terms. Exports of goods increased by 3.4 per 
cent, while exports of services increased by 4.9 per cent. Goods exports were 
affected by the slowdown in some major markets in the second half of the year, 
and as such, exports fell by 0.7 per cent, seasonally corrected, between the first 
and second halves of the year. Exports of services increased during the year - 
some part of this was due to an improvement in tourism services, but exports of 
other services grew reflecting continued growth in the number of firms in the 
sector and in employment in existing export services firms. 
 
The factors affecting growth in exports are the development of the world 
economy, the extent of any increase in supply capacity and any change in 
competitiveness. The usual measure of competitive trends, unit labour costs 
(ULCs), is limited in that it takes no account of other non-wage factors, such as 
quality and delivery, which can be important, and the trend in unit labour costs 
itself is a summary measure of an outcome rather than a driving force itself. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to look at developments in unit labour costs. The 
accompanying research note "Unit Labour Costs in Irish Manufacturing" discusses 
developments in detail. 
 
The general picture over an extended time frame gives a sense of the loss of 
competitiveness over the period of the expanding credit and property bubble in 
the Irish economy, followed by the contraction in unit labour costs thereafter. As 
can be clearly seen, from Figure 1.2 in the accompanying note, the increase in 
Irish ULCs over this period was concentrated in the traditional sector, i.e. the food 
and drink sectors mainly, with costs in the modern sector, pharmaceuticals, 
falling to less than half of the base year level, whereas the traditional sector ULC 
remains slightly higher. The development of ULCs in the modern sector perhaps 
goes some way to explain the continued investment in Ireland by overseas firms. 
The performance of the traditional sector since the onset of the financial crisis is 
somewhat subdued. Despite having declined from its peak level in the third 
quarter of 2008, the ULC index for the sector still remains high, when compared 
against earlier levels.  
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Looking now at exports this year and next, data for the first quarter 2012 for 
merchandise exports indicate the continued weakness in the international 
economy. Traditional sector exports from the food and drink sectors have 
remained very static, while the data on modern sector pharmaceutical exports 
have been affected by major products coming off patent. What is critical for the 
economy is the impact that a drug coming off patent has on output and 
employment, as the reduction in the value of exports because of a price fall will 
have a counterpart in a reduction in profit and in net factor outflows. There will 
also be a reduction in corporation tax receipts, although the extent of this also 
depends on how much additional "tax sheltering" firms engage in. The weakness 
of the euro will improve competitiveness of domestic costs, particularly vis-à-vis 
the US in the short run. This will have a positive effect on export volumes via the 
effect on decisions regarding the location of production by multinationals. In 
addition, if the assumed recovery in the eurozone economy does materialise 
there could be a recovery in exports of goods continuing into 2013. There has 
also been a steady increase in the number of new overseas firms and an 
expansion of existing firms, for example, Amazon, Sky, Google in the services 
sector and Intel in the manufacturing sector; both factors have the potential to 
contribute to increase exports.  
 
Exports of services are not affected just by growth in the world economy. They 
are also influenced by location decisions on the supply side by multinationals. The 
increase in the numbers of firms and in employment geared to overseas services 
has continued throughout this recession. This will add to output and employment 
both this year, where we are forecasting a volume rise of 3.8 per cent in other 
service exports, and next year where the volume rise could be 4 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 Exports of Goods and Services, Volume % Change 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
 % % % 
Merchandise 3.4 2.8 3.1 
Tourism 7.4 2.8 3.5 
Other Services 4.8 3.8 4.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 4.1 3.3 3.5 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
 
Tourism receipts have been affected by the slowdown in GDP in major markets, 
with the final quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of this year adversely affected. 
The latest data, covering the February-April period show some pick-up, but it is 
very modest. Weakness in the euro may lead to some improvement in numbers 
from the United States. Accordingly, our forecast is for some growth for the year 
of 2.8 per cent, while next year it could be 3.5 per cent. 
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Exports of goods and services are forecast to grow by 3.3 per cent in volume 
terms this year and by 3.5 per cent in 2013. Given the weakness of the euro we 
expect export prices to increase by about 2.7 per cent in 2012 and 1.3 per cent in 
2013.  
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3 
 
Investment 
 
On the basis of the currently available data investment contracted in 2011 for the 
fourth consecutive year, although the decline was more moderate than that 
recorded in 2009 and 2010 at about 10.6 per cent. 
 
With house prices weak and demand levels remaining low, available indicators to 
date, see Figure 1, support the view that it is unlikely that there will be growth in 
the volume of house building over the forecast period. In an accompanying article 
there is some indication that adverse factors affecting the housing market may be 
moderating, particularly in urban areas. It is difficult to be more precise as to 
when the bottom of the cycle will be reached but an important factor in any 
stabilisation will be price expectations. Continued uncertainty about prices, 
combined with a desire to see a sustained stabilisation before people enter the 
market means that housing demand is likely to remain weak in 2013. This, in 
conjunction with credit constraints on purchasers and builders, means that we do 
not expect any growth in house building levels in 2013. Uncertainty may also 
affect other building and construction by the private sector this year. There has 
been a steady flow of inward investment and expansion announcements, 
including that of Intel, particularly notable because of its size, and the National 
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) has indicated that it will undertake a 
significant amount of commercial and residential construction investment over 
the next four years. Thus, the volume levels of other building and construction 
are expected to increase by 3.8 per cent next year. Taking account of transfer 
costs of land and buildings means that we expect an increase in activity in total 
building and construction next year of approximately 1.6 per cent. This, coupled 
with the constraints on government spending, means that we expect investment 
in building and construction will decline by 8.4 per cent in 2012 in volume terms. 
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FIGURE 1 Housing Market Indicators 
 
 
 
We also suspect that uncertainty about the international environment will result 
in some re-assessment of investment decisions by companies and so growth in 
the components of investment in machinery and equipment will be more 
moderate than we had previously thought. We now expect that growth in this 
component of investment will be 5 per cent in volume in 2012. Notwithstanding 
this investment is expected to continue to decline in 2012, by 2.7 per cent in 
volume terms. Based on the forecasts for the components of building and 
construction outlined above, which coupled with stronger investment in 
machinery and equipment, means we are now forecasting that investment will 
grow by 4.3 per cent in volume terms in 2013.  
 
TABLE 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % Change in Volume 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
 % % % 
Housing -28.2 -4.6 0.0 
Other Building -7.6 -10.5 3.8 
Transfer costs -4.5 -10.0 -12.0 
Total Building and Construction -16.0 -8.4 1.6 
Machinery and Equipment -2.0 5.0 7.5 
Total -10.6 -2.7 4.3 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
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Household Consumption 
 
Preliminary annual data for 2011 show a decline in the volume of private 
consumption spending for the fourth year in a row. The average level of spending 
in 2011 was marginally above that of 2005 in real terms. In an accompanying note 
we look in more detail at a variety of data in relation to household spending and 
saving. This adds to our understanding of the factors affecting saving and 
consumption. Previously the decline in consumption was seen as deriving from 
the fall in income as a result of the decline in output. This was compounded by a 
rise in the savings rate as households simultaneously reduced their borrowing 
and increased saving because of uncertainty about future employment prospects 
and post-tax income as the fiscal consolidation proceeded. More recently 
available data from the latest Household Budget Survey (HBS) indicate that the 
situation may be more complex. Over the pre-recession period and the present, 
nominal incomes in the economy as a whole increased very marginally. However 
increases in mortgage repayments more than absorbed the modest increase in 
incomes and consequently household expenditure on all other items, with the 
exception of fuel and light, experienced declines. The HBS data also indicate a 
modest increase in household savings, much less than that shown from other 
measures of savings, where mortgage repayments and increases in pension funds 
appear as savings. It also echoes the qualitative evidence from the Nationwide UK 
(Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index which has shown a broadly stable attitude amongst 
savers in recent years in relation to their own savings behaviour and their 
perception of the amount they save. The extent of precautionary saving may be 
less than previously thought and consequently a reduction in such savings, while 
it would certainly add to domestic demand, may offer much less hope for a 
return to much more rapid growth. Of course, while this is the situation for 
average households - clearly some are experiencing extreme difficulties and have 
little scope for either saving or increased consumption. Others may be in a 
stronger position, though still affected by uncertainty about the future course of 
taxation, public expenditure and employment. 
 
Against this background it is easy to see how household expenditure has 
continued to decline. Quarterly data are very volatile, occasionally indicating an 
increase in household spending, followed by a further decline, against a 
background of a downward trend since the peak level in the first quarter of 2008, 
see Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 Volume of Personal Consumption, Level, € millions 
 
 
 
For 2012 we expect a continuation of this downward trend. Retail sales, the 
short-term indicator of consumer spending, were very weak in the first quarter. 
The volume of retail sales fell by 2.4 per cent compared with the final quarter of 
2011, and was 2 per cent below the average level of 2011. The preliminary 
estimate for April showed a further decline. This may well reflect the bringing 
forward of consumer purchases in advance of the anticipated VAT increase that 
came into effect in January of this year. It is also likely that renewed concerns 
about wider economic developments, visible in the latest decline in the KBC/ESRI 
Consumer Confidence Index, may have dampened retail spending once again. The 
basic underlying problem, however, is that disposable incomes are set to fall 
again this year. Income from employment will increase very moderately, while 
transfer income from welfare payments will decline following changes in the 
welfare code. Overall personal income will decline, while taxes on personal 
income and wealth will increase. As a consequence household spending may fall 
by about 2 per cent in volume terms this year.  
 
In terms of the time path, we expect the first quarter household spending to 
show a decline of about 2 per cent, followed by a further decline of about 1 per 
cent in the second quarter, followed by stability for the second half of the year. 
This is heavily conditional on the assumed slow recovery in the eurozone 
economy and increased exports from Ireland. This feeds into employment, gross 
earnings and disposable income. 
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Turning to 2013 we are assuming the international situation remains positive 
from the latter half of this year, even if very muted, so that export growth and 
hence, output, employment and incomes in the export sector increase leading to 
an increase in personal income. As taxes are set to increase under the 
consolidation programme, real personal disposable income will remain very flat 
compared with 2012. Household spending may decline by only 0.5 per cent in 
real terms, the lowest decline since the recession started. We are expecting price 
inflation of about 1.5 per cent, though this could be less if oil prices weaken. 
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Public Finances 
 
The recently published Stability Programme Update (Department Of Finance, 
April 2012) shows a more positive outcome to the public finances in 2011. While 
the headline deficit is recorded as reaching -13.1 per cent of GDP, this reflects 
monies used in the July 2011 recapitalisation of the banking sector. The outturn 
for the underlying general government deficit was -9.4 per cent of GDP. The 
better performance reflects a number of factors including higher than expected 
revenue, lower voted expenditure and a better than expected outturn for the 
Local Government Sector. On first viewing, this positive revenue performance has 
continued into this year, data for the first five months of the year shows the 
public finances are performing well. At the same time current expenditure is 
forecast to be broadly unchanged compared to the Budget forecast. Once we 
take account of our forecasts on the capital side, where we expect some 
reductions in capital expenditure, (including lower non-voted capital spending to 
take account of the agreement with regard to the March promissory note 
payment), the exchequer deficit will be lower than previously anticipated at €16 
billion. 
 
The more important measure, and the one used for the targets under the EU/IMF 
programme, is the General Government Balance. The General Government 
Balance (GGB) measures the fiscal performance of all arms of government, takes 
account of the impact of various funds, including extra budgetary funds, non-
commercial State sponsored bodies, the Social Insurance Fund and the net 
borrowing of the local government sector, as well as the impact of the National 
Pension Reserve Fund, and accrual adjustments. Although economic activity is 
forecast to show only moderate growth, we expect that the fiscal targets for 2012 
will be met. This is based on the view, expressed in our previous Commentary, 
that the negative impact of new taxation measures on revenue would be less 
than anticipated at the time of the Budget. In addition, the public finances will 
also benefit this year from higher income from Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
interest, paid initially to the Central Bank in 2011 and then transferred to the 
Exchequer this year. Thus, the final outturn for 2012 will meet the revised target 
of 8.3 per cent. The referendum result means that the fiscal profile over the next 
four to five years can follow the path set out in the Stability Programme Update.  
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Turning to 2013, we expect that higher tax revenue from economic growth and 
consolidation measures combined with a moderate reduction in expenditure 
should result in an exchequer balance in line with current projections. 
 
At present a consolidation package of €3.5 billion is targeted for 2013. However, 
the ending of the interest payment holiday will mean that the impact on the 
general government balance will be much lower than the total consolidation 
amount. Although we expect stronger economic growth next year compared with 
this year we have revised our forecast for growth down compared with the Spring 
Commentary. These factors will make the target for 2013 more difficult to 
achieve. 
 
TABLE 5 Exchequer Finances 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Outcome 
€bn 
Outcome 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Net current expenditure 47.0 48.0 49.6 49.4 
Net voted expenditure 40.5 41.4 41.0 40.0 
Non-voted expenditure 6.5 6.6 8.6 9.4 
      
Current Revenue 34.4 36.8 38.5 40.5 
 Tax revenue 31.8 34.0 35.5 37.5 
Non-Tax revenue 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 
      
Current Budget Balance -12.6 -11.2 -11.1 -8.9 
      
Capital Resources 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 
Capital Expenditure 8.0 16.2 7.0 7.6 
Capital Expenditure - Voted 5.9 4.3 3.6 3.0 
Capital expenditure - non voted  2.0 11.9 3.4 4.6 
Capital Budget Balance -6.2 -13.7 -5.2 -5.9 
      
Exchequer Balance -18.7 -24.9 -16.3 -14.8 
as % of GDP -12.0 -15.9 -10.0 -8.7 
      
General Government Balance -48.6 -20.5 -13.3 -12.5 
as % of GDP -31.2 -13.1 -8.3 -7.5 
 
Note: The Exchequer Balance figure for 2012 is adjusted to take account of the arrangement made for the March promissory note 
payment of €3 billion. 
Source: Stability Programme Update and own forecasts. 
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Population and the Labour Market 
 
Both the Live Register and the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) show 
that unemployment remains at a very high level. QNHS data for 2011 show that 
the numbers at work in 2011 fell by 38,000 and the labour force fell by 26,000. At 
the same time the participation rate stabilised at just over 60 per cent and the 
numbers unemployed rose by close to 13,000 with the unemployment rate 
measured at 14.4 per cent in 2011. 
 
It is clear from the data that the labour market continued to weaken in 2011, 
with another large fall in the numbers employed and an increase in the numbers 
unemployed. The latest QNHS data for quarter 1, 2012 suggests that this 
weakening has continued, with the unemployment rate rising to 14.8 per cent. 
With employment across most sectors continuing to weaken, albeit at a more 
moderate pace, an annual average level of employment in 2012 of 1,797,000 is 
forecast. This represents a fall of 13,000. Although aggregate employment is 
expected to fall, we expect that 2012 should see stabilisation in some sectors, for 
example, industrial employment should stabilise on the back of continued growth 
in industrial output and exports. With stronger economic growth in 2013 the falls 
in employment should be much more moderate at just 5,000 and could be seen 
to represent a stabilisation of the overall labour market. 
 
The annual average number of unemployed in 2012 is expected to be higher than 
in 2011 at 315,000 and is expected to decline in 2013 to 308,000. Unfortunately 
much of the decline over the two years is due to high emigration levels and an 
unchanged participation rate. The accompanying note "The Impact of Recession 
on Migration" makes the point that between 2006 and 2011 net emigration 
among young members of the native Irish population was substantially greater 
than it was among any other groups defined by age or ethnic background. As 
employment opportunities remain weak, migration will remain high and the 
proportion of immigrants in unemployment will increase, as recent data 
indicates. If our forecasts of employment and unemployment levels are correct 
they imply that the labour force will continue to contract over the next two years. 
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TABLE 6 Employment and Unemployment 
 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Agriculture 85 83 81 81 
Industry 360 342 338 339 
of which: Construction 120 107 103 102 
Services 1,403 1,385 1,376 1,371 
      
Total at work 1,848 1,810 1,797 1,792 
      
Of which: non-agri. employees 1,446 1,427 1,420 1,420 
Others 317 300 295 290 
      
Unemployed 292 304 315 308 
Labour Force 2,140 2,114 2,112 2,100 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.6 14.4 14.9 14.7 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
 
Of particular concern is the on-going rise in the numbers who are unemployed for 
over a year. In the first quarter of 2007 the long-term unemployment rate was 
1.2 per cent, approximately 26,000 persons. By the first quarter of 2012 this had 
risen to 8.9 per cent, increasing to over 187,000 persons. Those who are long-
term unemployed now account for nearly 61 per cent of total unemployment, 
see Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3 Numbers Unemployed By Duration 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Household Survey. 
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Data from the QNHS provides us with some more detail on those who are long-
term unemployed. While there have been increases in the number of those 
unemployed for over a year across gender and available age bands, the main 
increase is in those aged between 25-44 years, primarily males, see Figure 4.  
 
FIGURE 4 Long-Term Unemployed by Age and Gender, Percentage Distribution and 000s 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed with data from the Quarterly National Household Surveys, CSO. 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q1 2007 Q4 2011 Q1 2007 Q4 2011
Males Females
Lo
ng
 T
er
m
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 (%
)
Age 15-24 Age 25-34 Age 35-44 Age 45 Plus
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
Q1 2007 Q4 2011 Q1 2007 Q4 2011
Males Females
Lo
ng
 T
er
m
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
  (
00
0s
)
Age 15-24 Age 25-34 Age 35-44 Age 45 Plus
16  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 2 
 
Table 7 updates analysis by Kelly et al. (2012) 2 showing the educational 
attainment of those who are long-term unemployed separately by gender. Prior 
to the current crisis, the education profile of long-term unemployed (LTU) males 
and females was quite similar, with over 50 per cent of both groups having low 
levels of educational attainment (i.e. Junior Certificate or less). However, the 
education composition of the long-term unemployed has changed considerably 
since the commencement of the recession. Now less than half of long-term 
unemployed males and females have low levels of educational attainment, while 
there has been a rise in the percentages with higher levels of education. In 
relation to males, there has been a big increase in the proportions with Post-
Leaving Certificate qualifications, which is most likely due to the downturn in the 
construction sector. Regarding females, there has been a large rise in the 
percentages with a Leaving Certificate and Third-level qualification. Based on the 
numbers (see Table 7), it would appear that in the current recession females with 
low levels of educational attainment are withdrawing from the labour force, 
while those with higher levels of education are remaining in the labour market. 
 
TABLE 7 Educational Attainment of the Long-Term Unemployed: Q1 2007 and Q4 2011 (Per Cent) 
 
 Males  Females 
 Q1 2007 Q4 2011  Q1 2007 Q4 2011 
      % Number     % Number     % Number     % Number 
Lower Secondary or 
Less 
63.5 11,836 40.9 53,962  58.1 3,913 25.6 11,610 
Higher Secondary 20.4 3,804 29.3 38,666  19.5 1,314 34.0 15,415 
Post Leaving Cert 5.9 1,108 17.7 23,351  11.3 762 15.2 6,879 
Third-level 10.2 1,895 12.1 16,034  11.1 747 25.2 11,413 
Total 100 18,642 100 132,031  100 6,736 100 45,318 
 
Source: Constructed with data from the Quarterly National Household Surveys, CSO. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and P. O'Connell, (2012) "Submission to the Joint Committee on Jobs, Social Protection and 
Education on Unemployment and Youth Unemployment", April.  
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Incomes and Prices 
 
Data from the Institutional Sector Accounts on aggregate income of employees 
provides information for 2011 that is consistent with the National Accounts. 
Figure 5 shows the annual rate of change in each quarter and illustrates the 
extent to which household incomes fell during the downturn. The data shows 
that economy wide earnings remained broadly unchanged in 2011, although the 
annual number masks the fact that earnings started to increase slightly in the 
second half of the year, the first increase since the end of 2008. Although the 
economy and labour market remain weak there has been a steady flow of job 
announcements, primarily in the modern sector. On the expectation that many of 
these jobs will have pay rates higher than the jobs that have been lost, hence 
raising average earnings in the economy as a whole, we would expect that 
aggregate non-agricultural wages will remain unchanged in 2012, at a time when 
employment continues to fall. 
 
FIGURE 5 Annual Percentage Change in Compensation of Employees 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Quarterly Institutional Sector Accounts. 
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TABLE 8 Personal Disposable Income 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 € bn € bn € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.8 69.0 68.9 69.0 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.7 15.1 17.1 18.0 
      
Total Income Received 88.2 87.1 89.1 90.2 
Current Transfers 26.5 26.6 25.9 25.6 
      
Gross Personal Income 114.7 113.7 114.9 115.9 
Direct Personal Taxes 20.8 22.2 23.1 23.9 
      
Personal Disposable Income 93.9 91.5 91.8 91.9 
Consumption 82.6 81.1 80.7 81.6 
Personal Savings 11.3 10.4 11.1 10.3 
Savings Ratio 12.0 11.4 12.1 11.3 
Average Personal Tax Rate 18.1 19.5 20.1 20.6 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
 
Taking account of transfers and taxes means that we estimate personal 
disposable income fell by 2.5 per cent in 2011. Although personal consumption is 
still contracting, the personal saving rate fell from about 12 per cent in 2010 to 
11.4 per cent in 2011. As shown in the accompanying note on the savings rate 
during the recession the fall in household income, at a time when housing related 
expenditure has risen, has reduced the available resources for households. 
However, if our forecast improvement in activity occurs then we would expect to 
see a moderate increase in personal disposable income of approximately 0.3 per 
cent in 2012 and 0.1 per cent in 2013.  
 
Consumer Prices 
The annual rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI) has averaged 2.0 
per cent in the first five months of this year. More interestingly the CPI has been 
unchanged for April and May. While energy prices contributed to inflation in 2011 
and remain high, there are unlikely to be further increases. Indeed, weaker world 
economic activity may result in some downward pressure on energy prices and 
we could see some declines. In an Irish context, weak domestic demand levels 
may also contribute to lower inflation in services. However, current euro 
weakness may contribute to higher import costs and so we have revised our 
inflation forecast for this year, increasing it marginally to 1.7 per cent. Although 
we expect activity levels to increase next year inflation will be marginally lower at 
1.5 per cent as a result of a small decline in energy prices. 
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Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
The weakness in the domestic economy is reflected in the performance of 
imports of goods and services last year. Based on the preliminary National 
Accounts, imports of goods and services contracted by 0.7 per cent in volume 
terms in 2011. 
 
Trade statistics show that visible imports rose by 5.2 per cent in value, although 
they declined by 3.1 per cent in volume terms. Within this, the value of imports of 
capital goods fell, while both consumer goods and intermediate goods increased. 
Given the weakness of the personal sector, the increase in consumer goods 
imports is somewhat surprising, although the increase in intermediate goods is in 
line with the performance of production and exports. Based on data from the 
Balance of Payments, payments of royalties and other service imports showed a 
modest rise in 2011. 
 
Given our expectation of a weaker external environment with consequent slower 
growth in production and exports, and continuing weakness in consumer 
demand, we anticipate that merchandise imports will decline by approximately 1 
per cent this year. The continuing contraction in personal consumption is 
expected to feed through into imports of consumer goods, while recovery in 
investment in machinery and equipment and continuing export growth will be 
reflected in imports of capital and intermediate goods. Tourism imports are 
expected to contract at broadly the same rate as in 2011, but with manufactured 
exports likely to grow marginally slower, a more moderate rate of growth in 
royalties and other services seems likely. On this basis, we expect that total 
imports of goods and services will return to moderate growth in 2012, increasing 
by 0.9 per cent in volume terms and by 3.3 per cent in value. 
 
The forecast strengthening of activity in 2013 means that we have revised 
upwards our forecasts for import volumes. We now expect that the increase in 
domestic activity levels will result in merchandise import growth of 
approximately 2 per cent and imports of other services will increase by 3.5 per 
cent in volume. In contrast, we still expect some decline in tourism imports as 
Irish households remain constrained. Overall, we forecast growth in the volume 
of imports of goods and services in 2013 of 2.6 per cent and by 3.7 per cent in 
value, see Table 9.  
20  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 2 
 
TABLE 9 Imports of Goods and Services, % change, Volume 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
 % % % 
Merchandise -3.1 -0.9 2.0 
Tourism -6.0 -7.0 -5.0 
Other Services 1.1 2.5 3.5 
     
Imports of goods and services -0.7 0.9 2.6 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts 
 
On the basis of the preliminary Balance of Payments, the merchandise trade 
surplus was unchanged in 2011 at €36.4 billion. The service trade balance 
remained in deficit, although more moderate than the previous year. Taking 
account of both these components the surplus on trade in goods and services 
rose by nearly 14 per cent to €33.2 billion. Once account is taken of income flows 
a marginal surplus of just €0.1 billion was recorded. 
 
Reflecting the external environment, credit flows are expected to be unchanged 
this year, while debit flows will show only moderate growth. Net factor outflows 
should amount to approximately €33 billion in 2012. Both debit and credit 
income flows will grow in 2013, in the case of debit flows primarily as a result of 
higher national debt interest payments. Net factor outflows are expected to be 
€36 billion. Even when these net factor flows are taken into account, we expect 
that the current account will be surplus in each year, perhaps to the extent of 3.8 
per cent of GNP in 2013. While the surplus may appear large it reflects the fact 
that we expect a moderate improvement in Ireland's terms of trade, following a 
sharp dis-improvement in 2011. 
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GDP and GNP 
 
Preliminary estimates from the CSO show that GDP in volume terms grew by 0.7 
per cent in 2011. In contrast, GNP declined by 2.5 per cent in the year. In previous 
Commentaries we have discussed the alternative measures of output available.3 
While GDP measures the total value of output of goods and services produced in 
a country, GNP subtracts net income flows between Ireland and the rest of the 
world. What is striking is the gap between the two measures, with one suggesting 
marginal growth while the other would indicate that the economy contracted in 
2011. The main factor underlying this difference is a large increase in net factor 
flows. The quarterly data shows that this was particularly pronounced in the final 
quarter of 2011, although this is compared with much lower flows in the fourth 
quarter of 2010, see Figure 6. 
 
FIGURE 6 Expenditure on GDP, Net factor Flows and GNP, Quarterly Data, Constant Prices 
 
 
 
Turning to this year and next we expect GDP to increase in 2012 at about the 
same rate as in 2011, at 0.6 per cent but to increase faster in 2013, at 2.2 per cent 
on the assumption of a better international environment. GNP is forecast to 
remain unchanged this year and to increase by 0.5 per cent in 2013. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 For example, see Box 2: Measures of Output, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2011. 
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On the output side net agricultural output is likely to increase marginally in 
volume terms in both years. In industry output is likely to fall this year, primarily 
because of a fall in construction activity, though other industrial output may 
remain relatively unchanged this year. First quarter manufacturing output was 
very weak, so that the pick-up in April needs to be sustained. If the international 
profile outlined is correct we expect output in manufacturing to rise by 2 per cent 
next year. Total services output is forecast to increase marginally this year, and by 
1.8 per cent in 2013. Non-market services are likely to be seriously constrained, 
but market services could improve as international services grow, and perhaps 
with some substitution between public and private services in healthcare. 
 
 
Mon eta ry  S ecto r  Dev e lop me nt s  |  23  
 
10 
 
Monetary Sector Developments 
 
Bank Funding 
Looking at evidence relating to the liabilities of the Irish banking system, the 
overall picture of recent Irish deposit movements that emerges is one of a 
stabilisation in mid-to late-2011, followed by a steady increase in private deposits 
held at covered banks thereafter (see Appendix 1 on Developments in Irish 
Private Sector Deposits). Market-based funding pressures remain elevated, 
however, and despite successful deleveraging progress made in 2011, Irish banks 
face a sizeable task in reducing their balance sheets amidst an increasingly less 
benign international environment. 
 
Irish bank deleveraging required in the EU-IMF programme is effectively intended 
to wean Irish credit institutions off the substantial provision of Exceptional 
Liquidity Measures (ELM) currently availed of. Reduced borrowing from the ECB is 
primarily targeted for the covered (non-IBRC) banks, with further reductions 
likely to depend on what happens to IBRC rather than the act of deleveraging 
alone.4 It is also expected that more sustainable sources of market-based funding 
will become available to Irish institutions once their loan books are more closely 
aligned with stable sources of funding like those of customer deposits (both retail 
and corporate) and once the sovereign begins to return to the market. This access 
to funding depends on the eurozone interbank market beginning to function 
smoothly once again. However, as of yet, this seems far off. 
 
Total emergency funding measures stood at close to €118 billion as of end-April 
2012, roughly 65 per cent (€77 billion) of which was ECB funding with the 
remainder coming from the Central Bank of Ireland.5 This represents a decline in 
overall ELM provided to Irish banks of €40.5 billion from the €158.8 billion peak 
reached in February 2011 shortly after the EU-IMF programme was agreed. While 
deleveraging targets for 2011 were exceeded with terms that were better than 
anticipated, the environment for asset disposals is expected to worsen over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 The Covered Banks include AIB Group (including EBS Building Society), Bank of Ireland Group, Permanent TSB and 
IBRC. 
5 This includes Emergency Liquidity Assistance provided by the Central Bank of Ireland which makes up the majority of 
'other assets' in the financial statement of the Central Bank. A recent reclassification of 'other assets' means that 
these amounts are now recorded under 'other claims on eurozone credit institutions'. It also includes borrowings 
from the eurosystem relating to monetary policy operations for the domestic group of banks (i.e. those which have 
significant business with Irish resident households and non-financial corporations in terms of credit and deposits). 
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next two years.6 As much as €2 trillion in balance sheet reduction measures 
across the EU banking system are expected during 2012 and 2013, with up to 
three-quarters of the reduction measures expected to come from sales of 
subsidiaries, securities and noncore assets.7 Such measures are likely to impact 
on the capacity of Irish banks to sell assets and the sale prices achieved. They are 
also likely to result in more widespread negative impacts on economic activity, 
particularly in terms of global credit supply.8 
 
In addition, the latest IMF staff report noted concerns that targets for banks loan-
to-deposit ratios have bid up deposit rates, thus undermining bank income, while 
larger than expected run-offs of banks' non-core loan portfolios are also 
threatening to constrain domestic credit conditions. Existing deleveraging targets 
may, therefore, be altered later this year in order to separate out the targets into 
those for core and non-core assets so as to minimise such negative side-effects. 
Any engagement in substantial new lending will be to the detriment of the loan-
to-deposit ratio target of 122.5 per cent being achieved by end-2013. 
 
Given the requirement for further deleveraging to the tune of some €36 billion 
over the remainder of 2012 and 2013, along with an increasingly less 
accommodating international environment for asset disposals, a danger to the 
Irish recovery is that of Irish banks failing to replace maturing loans with new 
lending as an alternative means of achieving their official balance sheet reduction 
targets. This could potentially stifle the economic recovery further over the next 
two years as the deleveraging process continues. The rationale for the policy of 
deleveraging is ultimately to reduce the reliance on ECB funding and to make 
banks more attractive to market-based forms of financing. Current EU policies 
appear to be failing to relieve pervasive stresses in eurozone money markets, 
however. On this basis, it is worth considering whether the end-2013 target for 
the deleveraging programme will actually yield a banking system that is more 
conducive to sustainable market-based financing at that time, given the current 
likelihood that these stresses are likely to remain in the near future. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 See IMF staff report: Ireland: Fifth Review under the Extended Arrangement, International Monetary Fund, February 
2012. 
7 Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April 2012, pp.6,33. 
8  See also the Euroframe report: 'Economic Assessment of the Euro Area: Winter 2011/2012 Report', Euroframe 
Network, January 2012. This estimates the impact of banking recapitalisation measures in the first half of 2012 as 
potentially lowering euro area growth by 0.8 percentage points. 
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Recent Lending Developments: 
Private Sector Credit 
After adjusting for non-transaction related effects, private sector lending 
conditions were seen to have deteriorated significantly during the first three 
months of 2012, with overall lending down 5.2 per cent, when compared to the 
same period of 2011 (see Table 10).9 In terms of the average pace of contraction 
for the first three months of the year, lending fell at its fastest annual rate in any 
quarter since overall lending began to fall in August 2009, down by 5.4 per cent. 
Within the overall fall in lending, loans to households declined at a slower pace 
than the experience in late 2010, yet the average pace of contraction over the 
past three months remained quite brisk. Mortgage lending, in particular 
continues to shrink rapidly, while consumer credit returned to a sharp rate of 
contraction after a slowdown in December 2011. The slowdown in December was 
largely the result of a base effect following a sharp decline in lending in the same 
month of 2010. However, the recent trend is still one of sustained declines.  
 
TABLE 10 Private Sector Credit and Small and Medium Enterprise Lending, Annual % change 
 
 Private Sector Credit Small and Medium Enterprise Lending 
 End- 
Month 
Total Household 
Credit 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Lending 
Consumer 
Credit 
Total excl. 
Financial 
Intermediation 
& Property 
Related Sectors 
Total excl. 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Total 
2009 Mar 3.8 6.0 7.8 -0.6 - - - 
 Jun 0.5 2.9 4.8 -3.6 - - - 
 Sep -2.3 0.2 1.9 -5.4 - - - 
 Dec -2.6 -1.1 0.6 -7.3 - - - 
2010 Mar -4.0 -2.6 -0.2 -10.6 - - - 
 Jun -3.7 -4.5 -0.8 -13.1 - - - 
 Sep -3.8 -4.5 -0.9 -14.1 - - - 
 Dec -4.5 -5.5 -1.4 -21.1 - - - 
2011 Mar -3.9 -5.0 -2.0 -15.0 -9.2 -11.3 -8.8 
 Jun -4.7 -3.9 -2.2 -14.4 -10.6 -12.5 -9.1 
 Sep -4.6 -4.0 -2.5 -13.7 -9.0 -8.4 -5.6 
 Dec -5.2 -3.6 -2.5 -6.9 -6.4 -5.7 -3.3 
2012 Mar -5.2 -3.9 -2.4 -11.6 - - - 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland Money and Banking Statistics. 
 
Looking at corporate lending, in particular lending to Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs), the rate of contraction appears to have slowed somewhat 
during the final quarter of 2011.10 Total SME lending declined by 3.3 per cent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 The adjustment reflects changes in non-transaction related reporting population, revaluations, exchange rates. 
10 As noted by Lawless, McCann and McIndoe-Calder (2012), Central Bank of Ireland (Quarterly Bulletin 2, April 2012), 
the significance of the SME sector in Ireland is evident from employment statistics which reveal that the sector 
accounts for 72 per cent of private sector employment outside of construction and agriculture, while 63 per cent are 
employed in indigenous SMEs. 
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year-on-year, yet core lending (i.e. that which excludes financial intermediation 
and property related sectors) continues to indicate substantial rates of decline, 
albeit slower than in any other period in 2011. 
 
The latest ECB Bank Lending Survey suggests that, across all categories of 
enterprises, both rising credit standards and reduced demand have begun to 
contribute to a modest deterioration in average lending.11 In this survey, changes 
in credit standards over the past three months are examined, with respondents 
indicating to what extent they feel that credit standards have deteriorated or 
eased over the recent quarter. Commercial respondents had previously reported 
that credit conditions in Irish banks were broadly stable for nearly two years after 
a more difficult lending environment emerged around mid-2007. Generalised risk 
perceptions (e.g. economic, collateral-based and industry or firm specific risks) 
appear to have been the foremost issues reported amongst borrowers during the 
past two years as impacting on credit standards. Terms and conditions attached 
to lending are reportedly now less benign than they have been in the past year. 
Recent research on Irish SME lending conditions based on the ECB survey on 
access to finance of SMEs in the eurozone also shows that, while demand for 
credit is relatively similar to that in other EU member states, Irish SMEs face 
significantly tighter financing conditions, by comparison.12 
 
A recently increased sensitivity to risk, however, has also seen a corresponding 
fall in reported demand from businesses for credit. The latest survey indicates 
that financing needs, in particular those relating to investment, are now more 
subdued than in 2011. As such, recent uncertainties relating to wider economic 
developments may be dampening both the demand and supply of credit. A strong 
correlation between the survey's reported change in demand for loans and credit 
lines for Irish SMEs and the index of consumer expectations on a quarterly basis 
over the period (Q1 2003 to Q1 2012) lends some support to the idea that 
weakening economic expectations amongst Irish residents may be impacting on 
demand for credit from indigenous enterprises.13 
 
The survey also suggests that household credit has tightened further more 
recently, with both supply of and demand for credit reportedly deteriorating. 
Conditions attached to loans have been more stringent over the last three 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The ECB's Euro Area Bank Lending Survey supplements existing quantitative data by giving some impression of the 
willingness of banks to lend, reflected in changes in their credit standards and in terms and conditions attached to 
loans or lines of credit. It is addressed to senior lending officers in participating banks, with over 100 euro area banks 
participating in the survey on a voluntary basis each three month period, of which 5 are from Ireland. 
12 Holton, S., M. Lawless and F. McCann (2012). 'Credit demand, supply and conditions: A tale of three crises'. Paper 
presented to the Central Bank of Ireland conference, 'The Irish SME Lending Market: Descriptions, Analysis, 
Prescriptions'. Central Bank of Ireland, March 2012. 
13 Analysis indicated a strong, positive correlation coefficient of 0.77 for the variables over the stated period. 
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periods observed, driven by stricter mortgage lending requirements, mainly in 
terms of loan-to-value ratios, but also maturity lengths. Again, this is reportedly 
due to heightened risk perceptions related to economic activity as well as housing 
market prospects. The deterioration in reported demand for loans for house 
purchases, which had moderated gradually from late-2008 onwards and actually 
recorded a modest improvement in mid-2011, is again contributing negatively to 
new lending. However, the demand for loans, when considered in terms of a 
twelve month moving average, remains far closer to neutral, when compared to 
recent years. As Figure 7 shows, the extent to which funding conditions are 
tightening relative to demand conditions appears to have been more significant 
of late in determining new lending. 
 
FIGURE 7 Reported Change in Funding Conditions (12 Month Moving Average) 
 
 
Source: ECB Bank Lending Survey. 
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11 
 
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
Economic Growth 
The preliminary National Accounts for 2011 show much weaker growth than we 
had anticipated at the start of the year. The main cause of this was the 
deterioration in the international environment during the second half of last year 
and the deterioration in the terms of trade. Concerns about the international 
environment heightened uncertainty. The recovery in activity in the first half of 
2011 gave way to a subsequent contraction. 
 
Since our last Quarterly Economic Commentary, forecasts for the international 
environment have been revised downwards and a contraction in eurozone 
activity is now expected this year. In recent years most, if not all, of the growth in 
the Irish economy has been due to the external sector. All indications are that 
domestic demand will contract again this year, the fifth consecutive year of 
contraction. Once again the principal factor determining the performance of the 
Irish economy will be the export sector. On the basis of the forecasts outlined in 
this Commentary we expect that the Irish economy will show only very moderate 
GDP growth in 2012 in volume terms. Taking account of our estimates for net 
factor flows means that we expect GNP to be unchanged this year. 
 
The current view is that there should be a recovery in economic activity levels 
internationally in 2013. The openness of the Irish economy coupled with the 
steady inflows of FDI and the gains in competitiveness in recent years means that 
Ireland should, as in the past, benefit from any international upturn. On the 
assumption that the international recovery starts in the second half of this year 
and is sustained into 2013 we would expect that domestic demand, including 
stocks, should show moderate growth next year. Combined with an upturn in 
export volumes we anticipate that the Irish economy will grow by 2.2 per cent in 
2013, as measured by GDP, and by 0.5 per cent when measured by GNP. 
 
Unfortunately, the economic growth we forecast is insufficient to result in any 
increase in employment. The unemployment rate may fall marginally because of 
emigration and reduced participation. Of particular concern is the rise in the 
numbers of long-term unemployed. The experience of the 1980s and 1990s 
suggests that long-term unemployment rates will fall, but with a significant lag on 
the rise in employment. However, the fall will be somewhat dependent on the 
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policies that are put in place to deal with the long-term unemployment issue (see 
Kelly et al., 2012) 1, along with the extent of competition from new entrants to 
the Irish labour market. 
 
Confidence and Consumption 
In previous Commentaries we had argued that a fall in the savings rate could help 
to boost personal consumption. Within the Irish economy personal consumption 
levels have fallen in recent years and continue to contract. At the same time the 
savings rate has risen sharply, as households seek to pay down debt and build up 
precautionary savings in an uncertain environment. It is hoped that an increase in 
consumer confidence will result in households starting to spend, thereby bringing 
about a stabilisation in and a consequent recovery in personal consumption. 
However, the analysis in the accompanying Research Note, "The Savings Rate 
during the Recession" suggests that any sustained upturn in confidence may only 
bring about a moderate improvement in consumer spending. Using data from the 
recent Household Budget Survey the note shows that, in addition to the falls in 
income, household resources have been reduced by the rise in mortgage 
repayments over the period 2004/05 to 2009/10. Expenditure on other items fell 
as households sought to maintain mortgage repayments. Thus, our view is that 
the current weakness of consumer spending combines both weak confidence and 
reduced resources. In recent months we have seen consumer sentiment improve 
somewhat. A closer examination reveals that this has primarily been the result of 
improving expectations while consumers remain concerned about their current 
situation. Ultimately improvements in sentiment will feed through into consumer 
spending. However, the relationship is more complex and may not bring about a 
significant rise in consumer spending in the short term, until improvements in 
disposable income occur.  
 
The Eurozone Crisis 
Given the risks posed to our forecasts stemming from renewed tensions in the 
eurozone, it is worth reflecting on the broader developments in recent times. We 
have remarked before that as the current situation represents an extraordinary 
set of circumstances it requires an extraordinary solution. We have argued that 
one element of the solution involves direct recapitalisation of the eurozone 
banking system. This would restore confidence to the eurozone banking system 
and lead to the interbank market functioning again. This is an essential 
requirement to restore confidence in the banking system and to provide funding 
for credit. Two arguments against this have been produced viz. the inflation 
impact and the moral hazard issue. Recapitalisation may lead to an increase in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and P. O'Connell, 2012, "Submission to the Joint Committee on Jobs, Social Protection and 
Education on Unemployment and Youth Unemployment", April. 
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M1 but will not enter the broader money supply process. Even if recapitalisation 
was excessive and the monetary base was added to by 2-5 per cent the 
inflationary impact of this over 2-3 years would be low.2 The loss of output from 
the continued high level of unemployment in a single year dwarfs any potential 
output loss from a temporary rise in the inflation rate. The moral hazard 
argument must confront the reality that this crisis has seen the fall of 
governments, inaction may lead to further falls, but more importantly no 
government could wish to visit the collapse in real incomes that has afflicted so 
many countries. The moral hazard argument is essentially about the future and it 
is possible to set up structures to limit the impact caused by the consequences of 
moral hazard. The Fiscal Compact is an example of this. It is necessary, however, 
to accept that there is an actual crisis today that needs an immediate solution. 
The provision of funds to Spain for recapitalisation has the potential to do this but 
it looks like an ad hoc approach and somewhat different in the terms and 
conditions that applied to others in receipt of funding. 
 
A Stimulus Package 
We have also argued before that, given the circumstances in the eurozone - the 
level of unemployment and the stagnation in output - expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies are needed. At the fiscal level this requires coordinated 
policies, with those governments capable of providing a stimulus doing so. This is 
what a single government would do. This approach, taken in conjunction with a 
recapitalisation of the eurozone banking system discussed above, offers the best 
hope for dealing with the output, unemployment and financial crises. The actual 
approach within the eurozone seems to rely on structural adjustment in labour 
and product markets as the sole means of dealing with the output and 
unemployment crisis, without accepting that the "internal devaluation" required 
by some countries involves cuts in incomes that are outside any previous ranges. 
Structural adjustment requires a long-term perspective to be successful so that 
looking to structural adjustment in the face of stagnant demand is likely to fail as 
a policy for the eurozone as a whole. At the present stage of the crises it seems 
unlikely that a coordinated set of fiscal policies will be adopted. Unfortunately, if 
any single government attempts a fiscal expansion alone, it would find it difficult 
if not impossible to finance. Thus, for a single country within the eurozone, 
economic growth is not a policy option. The debate "austerity or growth" is not a 
real debate as no government would prefer austerity to growth. Governments 
individually do not have the option to choose. In reality coordinated fiscal policies 
across the eurozone, recapitalisation of the eurozone banking system and a 
looser monetary policy, with some imaginative measures designed to reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 For example, the recent discussion of the impact of quantitative easing policy in the UK by Joyce, M., M. Tong and R. 
Woods (2011) "The United Kingdom's Quantitative Easing Policy: design, operation and Impact", Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, shows moderate increases in inflation resulting from policy measures adopted by the Bank of 
England. 
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long-term interest rates in the crisis countries, offer the best hope of moving the 
eurozone economy out of recession and onto a path of self-sustaining growth. If 
coordinated policies were adopted at EU level and not just in the eurozone this 
would strengthen the recovery. It is this approach that would reduce the impact 
of the government and private debt crisis now afflicting so many countries in the 
eurozone. Without this the multiple crises will continue. 
 
A Stimulus Package for Ireland 
Within a coordinated stimulus package for the eurozone we would not expect 
that this country would be providing any direct stimulus as the fiscal adjustment 
required over the next few years is so large. However, faster growth in the 
eurozone economy and hence in the Irish economy would limit the extent of the 
expenditure cuts and taxation increases within the Troika programme, would 
restore balance earlier to the public finances, and lead to growth rather than the 
stagnation that the economy has experienced since the collapse in output in 
2009. We would be very cautious about a domestic fiscal stimulus in Ireland, 
however funded, as history and experience shows that such a stimulus would 
have little effect on the domestic economy, but would lead to a worsening of the 
balance of payments. The crises of the 1950s and the 1970s-1980s provide 
sufficient cautionary evidence that, given the openness of the Irish economy, a 
large portion of any stimulus would go directly into imports.  
 
There is a view, incorporated in an agreement between the Government and the 
Troika, that some part of the sale of state assets will provide funds that could be 
used to finance a local stimulus package. There are three main arguments for 
selling state assets. First, there may be efficiency gains that only freedom from 
bureaucratic or political control can realise. There are also potential efficiency 
losses if a new ownership structure limits the potential for development. Second, 
the funds released may be used for additional public sector investment where the 
rate of return is greater. This would apply in a situation where government is 
cash-constrained. Third, the funds may be used to run down public debt. This 
makes sense if the cost of funds to government is greater than the return on 
state assets or the return on new state capital. Selling of State assets may also 
make some perverse sense where the emphasis of financial markets is on gross 
debt, where no allowance is made for the value of marketable state assets (and 
indeed cash balances), irrespective of the relative cost of funds and the return on 
state assets. 
 
The objective of a domestic fiscal stimulus is to increase demand in the belief that 
this will lead to self-sustaining growth in the domestic economy. As we have 
pointed out in previous Commentaries, this is most unlikely in an Irish context 
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where the domestic market is small. Selling state assets to provide a limited, in 
extent and time, stimulus is not obviously an efficient use of funds. There is a 
marked degree of unused capacity in the economy following the collapse in 
output, so that investment driven by domestic demand is unlikely to pick up for 
some time. Growth in the economy will come from exports and export driven 
investment.  
 
Personal Debt Writedown 
Clearly, the funding situation in the banking sector remains precarious and the 
notion of pervasive debt relief being granted to those in arrears is certainly not 
practicable if banks are to be put on a sustainable path and if the state is to 
return to self-financing outside of the EU-IMF programme in the foreseeable 
future. Unfortunately, additional resources may be needed by the banking 
system to meet new capital requirement rules, and the poor macro-economic 
environment may result in additional corporate and household sector losses. 
 
The desire to relieve borrowers, who are obviously and irredeemably over-
indebted, therefore, should recognise that the currently adequate capital 
resources provided by the state to banks are not unlimited. It is with that in mind 
that the forthcoming personal insolvency legislation must be framed in such a 
way as to best target those that are most at risk from unsustainable debt levels as 
opposed to those that are simply in arrears. There are legitimate concerns about 
a blanket application of debt writedown, which encourages strategic non-
repayment of debt, creates difficulty for future borrowings by those affected, and 
which ignores the question of who bears the losses. 
 
Nevertheless, some borrowers are clearly not in a position to maintain full or 
even partial repayments. Debt writedown in these circumstances recognises the 
reality of the situation and takes these inevitable losses upfront. Given the 
dominance of state ownership of banking, in effect this amounts to losses to 
taxpayers through reduced bank profits or a reduced market value of the banks 
when sold in the future. To go beyond recognising and accepting inevitable losses 
would not be in the best interest of taxpayers. 
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Appendix 1: Developments in Irish Private Sector Deposits 
Many commentators use the outstanding amounts provided by the Central Bank 
of Ireland when reporting on the change in deposits over a period. These are 
subject to a number of distortions arising from issues such as changes in 
exchange rates, other revaluations, reclassifications, NAMA transfers and other 
securitisations that do not necessarily reflect underlying flows over a period. By 
summing the underlying, adjusted transactions for a given number of months, 
however, it is possible to derive the net flow of deposits for the reporting 
institutions over that time period. Figure A1 shows these transactions on a 
cumulative basis between January 2004 and April 2012, where the starting point 
January 2004 is set as equal to zero. 
 
From the end of September 2008, at the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse, to 
end-January 2012, Irish private sector deposits saw a net outflow of almost €29.5 
billion, the equivalent of 18.3 per cent of 2011 GDP, when one includes 
institutions at the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). The vast majority 
of this related to corporate deposits, while the remainder related to households. 
Of the corporate sector deposits, almost 60 per cent of the net decline was due 
to transactions from those operating in the financial sector, mainly insurance 
companies and pension funds. Corporations outside of the financial sector also 
reduced their holdings, albeit at a more gradual pace. What is remarkably clear 
from the data is that deposit flows relating to Irish households were far less 
volatile than the corporate equivalent while, within the corporate sector, deposit 
flows relating to firms operating outside of financial services were also less 
volatile. 
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FIGURE A1 Cumulative Irish Private Sector Deposit Flows, Jan 2004 - Apr 2012 (where Jan 2004 = €0bn) 
 
 
 
Note: Data are non-consolidated and cover all credit institutions operating in Ireland. 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland, Money and Banking Statistics. 
 
Research on corporate and retail deposits drawing on daily net deposit ﬂows on a 
consolidated basis (i.e. excluding inter-bank deposits and inclusive of deposits 
from non-Irish residents such as those held in foreign subsidiaries of Irish banks), 
over the period February 2009 to December 2010 for the Irish banks from the 
Central Bank (McQuinn and Woods, 2012) suggest that August 2010 was a pivotal 
month for private sector deposits, with a trend of marked declines visible in both 
retail and household deposits from 20th August of that year. A major reason 
posited for the contraction commencing during this month relates to the 
anticipated expiry of the original bank guarantee scheme, the Credit Institutions 
(Financial Support) Scheme 2008. This scheme was due to terminate by end-
September and provided a state guarantee for all covered liabilities of covered 
institutions with no monetary limit. In anticipation of this expiry, numerous term 
deposits appear to have fallen due in August 2010 and were subsequently 
removed from the system as appetite waned for rolling over deposits in light of 
the scale of Irish banks refinancing pressures. 
 
The significant contraction in private sector deposits during the period that 
followed was also aggravated by increased concerns relating to Irish fiscal 
pressures and the capacity of the Irish state to support the liabilities of banks in 
Ireland. Long-term sovereign credit rating downgrades from Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's in July and August reflected the deterioration in market 
sentiment. These concerns ultimately resulted in a stronger reliance on liquidity 
support from the ECB and the Irish Central Bank in the form of emergency 
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liquidity measures, measures which would eventually accelerate the state's entry 
into the EU-IMF programme in late November. 
 
Returning to the IFSC inclusive and non-consolidated banking data, more recent 
developments in Irish private sector deposit flows have been more favourable 
across all sectors. Net outflows slowed during the second half of 2011 and 
remained broadly steady despite heightened eurozone tensions in the final 
quarter of the year. Since then, net deposit flows relating to both households and 
corporations experienced a small combined increase of almost €5 billion since the 
end of January. Gains in corporate deposits made up the majority of this, up by 
€4.2 billion over the same period, although household deposits began to increase 
earlier, rising by about €1.2 billion since the end of November last year.  
 
Newer data from the Central Bank of Ireland and the Department of Finance 
(DoF) which look at consolidated banking data, thus providing a more accurate 
assessment of the developments in private sector deposits, support the evidence 
of recent improvements in the deposit base of Irish institutions. In particular, 
covered banks appear to have shown an increase of between €5.1 billion and €7 
billion in outstanding private sector deposits from their respective troughs up 
until the end of 2011. The latest DoF data available to end-April 2012 indicates 
that deposits have also increased since the beginning of the year by an additional 
€4.3 billion, with the recent increases partly owing to a weakened euro which has 
boosted the value of UK-sourced deposits. They report that a little more than half 
of the increase during April came from the non-resident base. 
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Unit Labour Costs in Irish Manufacturing 
 
Eddie Casey 
 
Introduction 
In an economy such as Ireland's which is heavily dependent on exports as a 
determinant of economic performance, competitiveness is a key variable for 
consideration. One way of assessing competitiveness is to look at unit labour 
costs (ULCs), typically calculated as the ratio of compensation per employee to 
the unit of value added by each employee. This measure is widely used – a long 
running series on the unit wage costs in Irish manufacturing has been produced 
by the Central Bank of Ireland (see various Quarterly Bulletins, Table E.4).1 As 
broad competitiveness developments across all manufacturing firms can often 
mask very different shifts in underlying manufacturing sectors, this note seeks to 
estimate the underlying changes in two commonly identified sectors in Irish 
manufacturing, the 'modern' sector and the 'traditional' sector.  
 
Underlying Manufacturing Unit Labour Costs 
It is possible to obtain an up-to-date measure of underlying manufacturing ULCs 
derived from the overall manufacturing ULC series produced by the OECD, EU-
KLEMS industry level data, the latest data from the CSO on manufacturing 
earnings per hour and industrial production output volumes (see Appendix for 
methodology). On the basis of this measure, one can chart the progress of both 
the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors in terms of the implied competitiveness 
developments since 2000. The terms 'traditional' and 'modern' used within the 
context of Irish manufacturing primarily relate to the nature of the final output 
produced by each sector as opposed to the actual origin of firms involved or 
technological means of production employed.2 The former primarily comprises of 
more indigenous manufacturing industries, such as the food and beverage 
subsectors, while the 'modern' sector is comprised of a number of high-
technology and chemical sectors. While the overall trend that emerges is one of 
broadly improving competitiveness levels in Irish manufacturing, developments in 
the 'modern' sector appear to have flattered the overall progress made in recent 
years and softened the impact of weaker competitiveness developments in 
'traditional' sectors. It is worthwhile noting that ULC's are driven by labour cost 
developments, which in turn give rise to competitiveness gains and hence greater 
output. As such, the components of the ULC are interlinked. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 For an excellent discussion of labour cost competitiveness measures in Ireland, see O' Brien, D. (2011). 
2 For a further detail, see the appendix below or the CSO's 'Industrial Production and Turnover' publication. 
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improved labour costs are liable to attract further investment from firms, thereby 
expanding output, resulting in an improvement to both sides of the ULC variable. 
 
Looking at the change in the seasonally adjusted ULCs from the time of the 
overall Irish manufacturing ULC's pre-crisis peak, it is clear that both underlying 
sectors have experienced considerable competitiveness gains since the first 
quarter of 2006. Figure 1.1 reveals that the progress of the 'traditional' sector, 
while slower than that of the 'modern' sector, is still noteworthy, having fallen by 
almost one-fifth from its peak. The 'modern' sector has made far more progress, 
however, largely due to on-going productivity gains in the sector, whereas the 
'traditional' sector has experienced sharp declines in output, relying heavily on 
reductions in total labour costs since early 2008 to improve competitiveness (see 
Table 1.1). The 'modern' sector ULC for the first quarter of this year stood at 
almost half of the value of its recent peak, in seasonally adjusted terms. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 Comparison of ULCs in Irish Manufacturing (Seasonally Adjusted, Base: 2006 Q1 = 100) 
 
 
Source: OECD, CSO, EU-KLEMS and own calculations. 
 
More recently, improvements in ULCs for the both the 'modern' and the 
'traditional' sector appear to have lost some momentum and have actually risen 
since late 2011. Under the assumption that earnings remained unchanged over 
the first quarter of 2012 (the average quarterly change in the earnings data over 
the length of the available series is an increase of 0.3 per cent), the recently 
changed trend in the ULCs is likely to reflect a substantially poorer output 
performance in both the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors during the final 
quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of this year. In the 'modern sector', output 
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volumes in the large and volatile chemicals and pharmaceuticals subsectors 
declined by 3.7 per cent over the first three months of 2012, when compared to 
the previous quarter, in seasonally adjusted terms. This followed a quarterly 
decline of 1.0 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2011. Similarly, a recent 
weakening in the 'traditional' sector ULC partly reflected recent contractions in 
the volume of output from the food and beverage subsectors. Declines in these 
subsectors for the last quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 were 3.9 per 
cent and 7 per cent, respectively.  
 
TABLE 1.1 Estimated Sectoral Developments in Irish Manufacturing since Q1, 2006 
 
 Modern Traditional 
ULC, % change -48.9 -16.6 
Total Labour Costs, % change -25.9 -18.6 
Volume of Output (CSO figures) 25.1 -16.0 
Employment, % change -19.7 -11.4 
Change in Employment ('000's) -16.9 -22.7 
 
Source: CSO,OECD, EU-KLEMS and own calculations 
Note: Employment figures are for industry overall, not just manufacturing and are available up to the last quarter of 2011. Output 
volumes, ULC and labour cost estimates are available to the first quarter of 2012. 
 
Looking more closely at the underlying developments in the determinants of the 
ULC, it is clear that the 'modern' sector has been more aggressive in strides to 
improve competitiveness. As shown in Table 1.1, firms have reduced employment 
and total labour costs much more than in the 'traditional' sector, without 
impacting negatively on output volumes. Output volumes in the sector were 
actually up by 25.1 per cent from the first quarter of 2006 (the quarter of the 
peak in the overall Irish manufacturing ULC) to the first quarter of this year. The 
'traditional' sector, by contrast, has seen declines in output volumes of some 16 
per cent to coincide with relatively lower reductions in both staffing levels and 
total labour costs. 
 
Figure 1.2 looks at the long-run changes for the same underlying manufacturing 
series in Figure 1.1 using the first quarter of 2000 as the base year for each series. 
The longer run-series gives a sense of the loss of competitiveness over the period 
of the expanding credit and property bubble in the Irish economy, followed by 
the contraction in unit labour costs thereafter. As can be clearly seen, the 
increase in Irish ULCs over this period was concentrated in the 'traditional' sector 
with the 'modern' sector resuming its improvement long before a correction took 
hold in the 'traditional' sector. As of the first quarter of 2012, the 'modern' sector 
ULC has fallen to just 41 per cent of its original level, whereas the 'traditional' 
sector ULC remains more than 6 per cent higher. The performance of the 
'traditional' sector since the onset of the financial crisis, while more subdued than 
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the 'modern' equivalent, is still lower than levels visible from 2002 onwards and 
has declined from a peak of 131.5 in the third quarter of 2008. 
 
FIGURE 1.2 Long-Run ULCs in Manufacturing (Seasonally Adjusted, Base: 2000 Q1 = 100) 
 
 
Source: OECD, CSO, EU-KLEMS and own calculations. 
 
It is also worth considering the ULC measure in terms of relative developments 
using major trading partners for comparative purposes. Specifically, Figure 1.3 
portrays the relative movements of the Irish 'traditional' ULC with that of the UK 
manufacturing sector and the Irish 'modern' sector with that of the US 
manufacturing sector, based on levels in 2000. The comparison is judged to be 
useful given that the UK has been the predominant overseas market for final 
output similar to that produced in the 'traditional' sector, while US manufacturing 
industries are the main focus of the Irish 'modern' sector. 
 
The correction since then has been marked, however, with relative levels falling 
below 80 per cent of the UK manufacturing sector as of the last available reading 
in the first quarter of 2011. When the Irish 'modern' sector is compared with the 
performance of total manufacturing in the US over the same timeframe, it can be 
seen that the 'modern' sector began to adjust downwards at a much earlier 
stage, albeit more gradually. It reveals a considerable improvement in relative 
terms, down to 42.6 per cent of the US manufacturing ULC as of the third quarter 
of 2011. These results are partly due to the steep rise in the UK manufacturing 
ULC over the same period aiding the subdued improvement in the 'traditional' 
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sector, whereas a modest decline in the US manufacturing ULC lessens the 
improvement of the 'modern' sector's gains in implied competitiveness. 
 
FIGURE 1.3 Relative Manufacturing ULCs (Seasonally Adjusted, Base: 2000 Q1 = 100)3 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, CSO, EU-KLEMS and own calculations. 
 
While the results for the Irish 'modern' sector are particularly striking, especially 
when compared against other countries, there are reasons to suggest why this 
may be the case. First of all, if one were to only take account of those sectors 
which were most productive in comparative economies, then presumably, the 
results would also be quite strong over several years. When the 'traditional' 
elements of manufacturing, which are typically less productive and more labour-
intensive, are combined with the performance of the 'modern' sector, the overall 
result is a manufacturing ULC decline that is less pronounced on a national basis. 
Secondly, as noted by Forfás (2005), high Irish productivity levels in 'modern' 
manufacturing may reflect the considerable advantages from research and 
development, marketing and management practices undertaken by 
multinationals in other countries outside of Ireland. By virtue of this 
arrangement, the structure of the 'modern' sector in Ireland lends itself to far 
greater advances in productivity. Other economies that rely to a greater extent 
on labour-intensive manufacturing industries would be expected to exhibit a 
relatively less competitive manufacturing sector overall, by comparison. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Note that early ULC estimates from the OECD for 2011 Q4 appear to indicate that the Irish 'traditional' sector has 
continued its correction when compared with the UK manufacturing sector falling by as much as an additional 6 
percentage points according to the latest relative ULC estimates, whereas the 'modern' sector measure is unchanged. 
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Conclusions 
The acute decline in the Irish manufacturing ULC visible in recent years is 
indicative of labour productivity growth outstripping that of average 
compensation levels for employees, thus lowering costs faced by producers and 
providing an increasingly more favourable labour environment. Underlying 
sectoral developments, however, show that very different levels of progress have 
been made, with average labour costs and productivity improvements in the 
typically more labour-intensive 'traditional' sectors seemingly much slower to 
recover than in their 'modern' equivalent. Given that much of the improvement 
in the 'traditional' sector has been due to falling labour costs, further measures to 
boost productivity combined with continued wage restraint would clearly provide 
a further impetus for the recovery in overall manufacturing competitiveness. As it 
stands, this has been largely driven by advances in the 'modern' sector to date. 
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Appendix: Construction of the Sectoral Unit Labour Costs in Manufacturing 
As one of the most common measures of labour competitiveness, the Unit 
Labour Cost (ULC) is typically calculated as the ratio of compensation per 
employee to the unit of value added by each employee. It is frequently expressed 
as in the formula: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
 
The OECD provides a useful dataset on ULCs by economic sector, with data 
available for Ireland as far back as the first quarter of 1998 on a quarterly basis. In 
forming the ULC for the manufacturing sector, the OECD obtains the ratio of total 
labour costs to total real manufacturing output, thus bypassing the need for 
employee numbers in their calculation. Total labour costs here comprise total 
compensation of employees in return for work done over the specified period 
and include the value of the social contributions payable by employers:  𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  
 
Unfortunately, the overall series is only available after a considerable lag. 
However, as the series is described as the equivalent of the ratio between labour 
compensation/hour and labour productivity (i.e. real output), it is possible to 
update the available data using information available from the CSO's quarterly 
Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) and the Industrial 
Production and Turnover (IPT) release. This relies on the assumption that the 
increase in industrial production volumes equates to the increase in real output 
in the manufacturing sector and that hourly earnings equate to labour 
compensation per hour. The Irish manufacturing sector is typically further 
subdivided into the so-called 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors. The latter 
comprises of what are considered to be more indigenous manufacturing 
industries, mainly including the food and beverage subsectors. The 'modern' 
sector is comprised of a number of high-technology and chemical sectors and is 
far larger than the 'traditional' sector in value terms. Based on gross value added 
data from 2005 updated using the volume of production data from the CSO's 
Industrial Production and Turnover release, the 'modern' sector represents 71 per 
cent of all manufacturing (Q1 2012). 
 
In order to obtain a ULC series for the 'modern' and 'traditional' manufacturing 
sectors, the gross value added series used in the formation of initial weights for 
the industrial production series is first extended using the latest volume of 
industrial production data from the CSO for each sector. This gives two series of 
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weights for the manufacturing sector that correspond to the 'modern' and 
'traditional' sectors, which are then multiplied by the total labour cost series for 
manufacturing as a whole from the OECD data to give two new value series in 
real terms that represent the relative size of each sector. Both series are still 
limited by the length of the OECD data, however. Therefore, the quarterly growth 
for the volume of production series are applied once more to the remaining 
quarterly periods of the individual real output series in order to provide a more 
up-to-date estimate of output in the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors. In effect, 
this covers the denominators for both sectors in the ULC calculations. 
 
The next step relates to the labour cost side of the ULC measure. Using industrial 
level data from the EU-KLEMS database (available up to 2007), average levels of 
compensation per employees in representative sectors of both the 'traditional' 
and 'modern' sectors are obtained. These are then assumed to move broadly in 
line with one another and are supplemented with quarterly CSO data on average 
hourly earnings for the remaining period. This is judged to be a reasonable 
assumption given that compensation per employee data for both sectors exhibits 
a strong positive correlation in the initial EU-KLEMS dataset. Research by Baccaro 
and Simoni (2004) also shows that hourly wages per employee in the 'modern' 
and 'traditional' sectors trended very closely over the period 1985-1998. Using 
employment data from the CSO for the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors, total 
labour costs are then computed for each sector as the product of the numbers 
employed and the compensation per employee.4 This enables one to obtain an 
evolving share of total labour costs for each sector which is applied to the original 
OECD total labour costs for manufacturing. 
 
Finally, the ratios of the updated manufacturing labour costs series and the 
updated real output series are then rebased to reflect the peak in both series, 
which coincided in the third quarter of 2005.One caveat worth mentioning is that 
the production of ULCs typically employs compensation costs as the numerator in 
their calculation. These comprise pay, employers' social security contributions 
and other labour taxes and provide a more comprehensive measure of true 
labour costs experienced by businesses, when compared to average hourly 
earnings data from the CSO used here to augment the OECDs ULC series. The CSO 
earnings data only look at the sum of regular earnings, irregular earnings, 
overtime earnings and payment for days not worked for the quarter divided by 
total paid hours for the quarter and, therefore, has little to say in relation to 
business costs incurred in the form of employers' PRSI and other labour taxes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Ideally, data on employees rather than total employment would be used for each sector, but it is quite likely that this 
will not impact on the ultimate shares that are used in the construction of the index. 
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The Savings Rate during the Recession 
 
Joe Durkan (ESRI) and Niall O'Hanlon (CSO)1 
 
A major feature of the economy since the crisis began has been an increase in the 
personal savings rate from very low levels estimated during the 2000s. Figure 2.1 
shows the estimated savings rate from National Accounts data and from 
Institutional Sector Accounts, where the data overlap. The traditional measure 
comes from the National Accounts and this source has a much longer run of data. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 The Savings Rate 1995 – 2011 
 
 
 
Source: CSO National Accounts (NA) and Institutional Sector Accounts (ISA) 
 
Looking at the National Accounts data first, the level of the savings rate during 
the period 1998-2007 was low relative to those estimated for earlier periods and 
were associated with significant increases in the level of real household 
consumption, averaging 6.3 per cent from 1997-2007. The negative savings rate 
in 2000 was associated with a volume increase in consumption of 10.5 per cent 
between 1999 and 2000. In 2008 and 2009 the savings rate increased to 6.9 per 
cent and 10.5 per cent respectively from a level of 1.5 per cent in 2007 and these 
increases were associated with a decline in real household spending For 2010 our 
estimates put the rate at about 12.4 per cent. In the current situation one 
hypothesis is that the increase has been due to increased uncertainty re incomes, 
employment, and taxation arising from the crisis directly and the associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Gerard Reilly, CSO, in the preparation of the data and tables. 
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public finance crisis. This has been the basis for encouraging government to 
articulate its spending and taxation plans in detail, rather than presenting broad 
macro-aggregates. This also lies behind the belief that once households have 
realised a desirable net debt situation there will be a reduction in the savings 
rate, an increase in consumption and household investment, and a return to 
growth in domestic demand. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be tested. 
However, there are different measures of the savings rate and some data from 
other sources which provide some insights into what has happened since the 
crisis emerged. 
 
The Institutional Sector Accounts (CSO, 2012) and the Household Budget Survey 
2009-2010, First Results (CSO, 2012) are both useful sources of new data. The 
former is available quarterly and is more up to date than the annual National 
Accounts measure. The latter provides information on the pattern of expenditure 
and changes in the pattern over time. 
 
The institutional sector accounts also provide a different measure of household 
savings and of household disposable income. One advantage of the new 
definitions is that the savings, investment and net borrowing/lending of the 
household sector can be identified. The main adjustment to the National 
Accounts definition of savings is in relation to household depreciation, while on 
the disposable income side an adjustment is made for changes in equity of 
households in pensions. Figure 1 also shows the pattern of the savings rate using 
the data from the Institutional Sector Accounts for 2002-2010. 
 
The broad pattern from 2002 is similar to that from the National Accounts though 
the data is available up to 2011. The data show that the savings rate peaked in 
2009 and has fallen back since then. 
 
The Household Budget Survey 2009-2010 is designed to provide information on 
the pattern of expenditure by households. One objective of such surveys is to 
provide weights for indices of consumer prices, while another is to examine 
changes in expenditure patterns, picking up changes that are taking place in 
society, e.g. the emergence of mobile phone usage. The 2009-2010 survey 
provides comparable data from the 2004-2005 Household Budget Survey by 
average household at an aggregate level which allows us see the direct impact on 
households of the first years of the recession. Table 2.1 summarises the data for 
2004-2005 and 2009-2010. The HBS is concerned primarily with determining 
patterns of expenditure by households rather than income or income 
distribution. Nevertheless, given the representative nature of the sample the 
main income and expenditure numbers are relatively close to those of macro 
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aggregates when grossed up. The savings rate estimated from HBS data is 
conceptually different to that estimated from the National Accounts as the latter 
includes the capital element of mortgage repayments and the HBS savings rate is 
a cash based measurement.  
 
TABLE 2.1 Average Weekly Household Income, Expenditure and Savings 2004-2005 and 2009-2010 (€) 
 
 2004-2005 2009-2010 % change 
Income € € 
Direct Income 862.55 809.56 -6.1 
State Transfers 125.41 217.20 73.2 
Direct Taxation 144.98 141.05 -2.7 
Disposable Income 842.98 885.72 5.1 
Expenditure    
Food 142.74 131.28 -8.0 
Alcoholic drink and tobacco 47.18 39.48 -16.3 
Clothing and footwear 42.67 40.11 -6.0 
Fuel and light 30.65 35.35 15.3 
Housing 94.51 147.73 56.3 
Household non-durable goods 17.42 16.49 -5.3 
Household durable goods 35.55 30.06 -15.5 
Transport 122.74 116.31 -5.2 
Miscellaneous 253.61 253.81 0.1 
Total 787.07 810.61 3.0 
Total excluding housing 692.56 662.88 -4.3 
Savings 55.91 75.11 - 
Savings Rate 6.6 8.5 - 
 
The most striking aspect of the data is not the information we already know - the 
fall in income from employment, the increase in transfer income and the increase 
in the savings rate - but the very large increase in housing related expenditure. 
This, dominated by mortgage repayments, rose over the period by over 50 per 
cent, while most other categories of expenditure fell. Excluding housing, total 
other expenditure fell by 4.3 per cent. It is possible to see from these data what 
was going on as the economy moved from boom to recession. Households 
experienced a fall in income from employment, with social transfers helping to 
maintain aggregate income. However, mortgage repayments had increased 
sharply and absorbed an increasing amount of expenditure - increasing from 12.0 
per cent to 18.2 per cent of expenditure. Other expenditure fell. The picture it 
gives is of households increasing savings slightly, increasing mortgage payments 
but reducing other expenditure. The driving force behind the reduction in other 
expenditure was the need to maintain mortgage repayments. Consequently, 
other expenditure declined. 
 
These are aggregate figures for households as a whole. More detailed analysis of 
the 2009-2010 HBS where the data are broken down by age and housing tenure is 
instructive (Tables 2.2 and 2.3).  
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TABLE 2.2 Household Income and Selected Expenditure by Age of Reference Person € Per Week 
 
Age % of 
H/Hs 
No. 
in 
H/H 
Disposable 
Income 
Total 
Expenditure 
Housing 
& 
Childcare 
Disposable 
Income-
Housing 
& Childcare 
Disposable 
Income- 
Expenditure 
Savings 
Rate % 
<25 3.9 0.73 551.49 674.25 180.71 370.78 -124.76 -22.6 
<35 23.5 1.24 898.45 799.70 219.78 678.67 98.75 11.0 
<45 24.0 1.19 1001.54 944.99 236.00 765.54 56.55 5.6 
<55 18.4 1.35 1078.47 1004.07 164.78 913.69 74.40 6.9 
<65 14.3 1.0 899.02 808.66 110.61 788.41 90.36 10.1 
>64 15.9 .23 561.44 450.79 53.12 508.32 110.65 19.7 
 
TABLE 2.3 Household Income and Selected Expenditure by Tenure € Per Week 
 
Tenure % of 
H/H 
Disposable 
Income 
Total 
Expenditure 
Housing 
& 
Childcare 
Disposable 
Income-
Housing 
& Childcare 
Disposable 
Income- 
Expenditure 
Savings 
Rate % 
Owned 
outright 
30.6 793.69 683.02 58.98 734.71 110.67 13.9 
Owned with 
mortgage-
paid last 
mortgage 
35.5 1209.81 1153.72 301.75 908.86 56.09 4.6 
LA rented 9.8 504.77 448.84 69.86 434.91 55.93 11.1 
Private Rent 20.8 723.3 673.08 183.06 540.24 50.22 6.9 
Rent Free 1.3 619.38 544.54 32.06 587.32 74.84 12.1 
Owned with 
mortgage and 
did not pay 
last mortgage 
2.0 900.59 734.79 79.03 
(398.02) 
821.56 
(423.54) 
165.80 
(-153.19) 
18.4 
(-17.0) 
Note: Figures in brackets are estimated on basis that the main mortgage payment was made. 
 
Table 2.2 shows that for many households housing costs and childcare costs take 
up a very significant portion of disposable income. Where the reference person is 
less than 25 years of age the average number at work is less than 1, while the 
average household size is almost 2.7. These households spend about one-third of 
disposable income on housing and childcare, and their weekly expenditure 
exceeds income significantly. These households account for 3.9 per cent of 
households in 2009-2010. Housing and childcare costs amount to 20-25 per cent 
of income for those aged 25 to less than 45. For older age groups these costs 
taper away sharply, as does income and the average number employed. 
Nevertheless, the excess of disposable income over expenditure is relatively 
modest except where the reference person is over 64 when the rate is almost 20 
per cent. 
 
Table 2.3 looks at the tenure status of households. The most interesting feature is 
in relation to those with mortgages. It is worth remembering that not all 
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households have mortgages, from the sample only 37.5 per cent have mortgages, 
though some have more than one. A distinction is made in the table between 
those who have paid their most recent mortgage (35.5 per cent of all households) 
and those who have not (2 per cent of all households). Households in arrears in 
2009-10 amounted to over 5 per cent of all mortgage holders. This is roughly in 
line with estimates at the time though clearly the situation has worsened since 
then. Comparing the two type of households the former have average household 
income that is significantly greater, have higher average income per person 
employed, have on average slightly less people in employment, though 
household size is roughly the same. We have estimated what the repayments 
would be for households who had not made their last payment, based on 
payments for mortgage protection policies. If the latter households did pay their 
mortgage their expenditure would exceed income by about 17 per cent. Clearly 
for these households something had to give. 
 
Conclusion 
This research note has provides some new insights into savings behaviour in the 
early stages of the recession based on a comparison between the Household 
Budget Survey of 2004-2005 and that of 2009-2010. What the comparison shows 
is that there was a very large increase in housing related expenditure, mostly 
mortgage payments, while most other categories of expenditure experienced 
declines.  
 
It is clear that two types of households were experiencing difficulties in 2009-
2010 viz. younger households and households where making the mortgage 
payment was beyond the financial capacity. However the bulk of households 
were staying within budgets even if there were limited new savings. These data 
are potentially very rich and will warrant further more detailed study. 
 
This of course relates to the situation that prevailed up to 2009-10. Since then 
interest rates have dropped dramatically and this has eased the situation, though 
for those in arrears it must still be challenging. This has created the potential for 
increased savings, both to meet future uncertainty, and to provide for future 
increases in interest rates.  
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The Impact of Recession on Migration: 
A Preliminary Analysis of Census 2011 
 
Pete Lunn, ESRI1 
 
This research note presents a preliminary analysis of data relating to migration 
from the earliest statistical releases of Census 2011 (Central Statistical Office, 
2012). The aim is to exploit the new data to draw inferences about the extent and 
composition of net migration associated with Ireland's deep recession, which 
began almost midway through the intercensal period of 2006-2011. It is hoped 
that the analysis offers some insight into the impact of the recession on different 
sections of Irish society, at least with respect to people's decisions to relocate to 
and from Ireland. 
 
The method employed is to infer net migration from differences in the size of 
matched subgroups of the population in successive Censuses. The intention is to 
exploit the comprehensive coverage of the Census. Its immunity to many 
sampling issues means that the quantitative picture produced by the Census may 
be a more reliable guide than attempts to track migration through smaller sample 
surveys. The downside, however, is that while the patterns described below offer 
insights, they are limited to calculations of net migration over five years, i.e. it is 
not possible to separate the relative contribution of immigration and emigration, 
or to compare non-Census years. This is important, because during this five-year 
period Ireland changed from a country with net inward migration to one with net 
outward migration (Central Statistics Office, 2011).2 The results reported can only 
reveal the combined effect. Thus, while the method illuminates aspects of recent 
migration, it would be a mistake to interpret the findings as latest or, worse, 
ongoing trends. 
 
Net Migration by Single Year of Age, 2006-2011 
The basic method is exemplified by Figure 3.1, which shows the population of 
Ireland by single year of age as enumerated in Census 2011 and, for comparison, 
the population enumerated in 2006 aged by five years, i.e. with the population 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Acknowledgements: I thank Alan Barrett, Adele Bergin, David Duffy, Joe Durkan, John FitzGerald, Petra Gerlach, 
Stefanie Haller, Philip O'Connell and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
2 Estimates of population and migration by single year are contained in this CSO release, but it is recognised that the 
estimates do not match the results of Census 2011. The discrepancy may reflect the difficulty of using a sample 
survey to estimate migration (the Quarterly National Household Survey is the primary source for the annual figures), 
or may be due to improvements in the Census coverage between 2006 and 2011. Resolving this issue is beyond the 
scope of this short note, which limits itself to the comparison of Census data. Revised annual figures are expected to 
be published by the CSO later this year. 
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profile recorded in 2006 shifted five years to the right.3 The difference between 
the two profiles therefore represents population change by single year cohort. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 Population Enumerated in Censuses 2006 and 2011, Matched by Single Year of Age in 2011 
 
 
 
Before proceeding to a more detailed comparison between the two profiles, 
Ireland's unique population profile is worthy of note. The sharp peak at 
approximately 30 years is in part due to historic patterns of family formation and 
fertility, but was accentuated by the age profile of immigrants during the boom, 
who were mostly in their twenties and early thirties. The scale and sharpness of 
this peak is truly striking. In 2011, Ireland had around 63,000 45 year-olds, 83,000 
30 year-olds, yet just 57,000 15 year-olds. Hence, the 30 year-old cohort is 32 per 
cent and 44 per cent larger again than the cohorts just 15 years older and 
younger respectively. Since immigration of young adults may be less likely in the 
future than in the recent past, the potential consequences of this steep 
fluctuation being maintained in the population profile merit consideration. Most 
obviously, while the profile explains the recent surge in the number of births, it 
strongly suggests that the number will fall again in coming years too. Over coming 
decades, it may also have implications for, among other things, the composition 
of tax revenues, the funding of pensions, and the demand for various health 
services. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 The population used for this analysis is the de facto population, which includes visitors on Census night. In 
comparison with the size of the effects reported here, the inclusion of visitors makes only a very marginal difference 
to the population profile by age, especially with respect to changes in the population profile between successive 
Censuses. 
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Notwithstanding marginal changes in the accuracy of Census coverage, once 
matched by cohort, population change is down to two factors: net migration and 
deaths. Since the aim here is to use population change to estimate the former, 
the potential impact of the latter needs to be understood. Deaths mean that any 
increase in the enumerated population is an underestimate of net inward 
migration. But by how much? Figure 3.2 uses data on death rates from the CSO's 
Vital Statistics series to compare raw population change, i.e. the difference 
between the curves in Figure 3.1, with an estimate of inward net migration that 
adjusts conservatively for the possible impact of deaths.4 Hence true net 
migration, which cannot be determined with perfect accuracy, lies somewhere 
between the two lines. The chart reveals that population change for cohorts up 
to 50 years in 2011 is dominated by net migration – deaths have only a marginal 
effect. Beyond age 50 the two lines would separate rapidly and the method used 
here would be inappropriate. Given this marginal impact of deaths, for the 
remainder of this analysis population change is employed as an estimate of net 
inward migration for cohorts up to 50 years, while recognising that the estimate 
is marginally on the low side among those over 30 years. 
 
Figure 3.2 reveals population growth for almost all cohorts, as the number of 
immigrants exceeded the number of emigrants. The highest net inward migration 
occurred among adults aged between their late twenties and late thirties in 2011, 
with the difference in net migration between people in their mid-twenties and 
those in their late twenties being particularly sharp. This age is the most likely 
time in the life-course to form long-term partnerships. Net inward migration was 
also high among children. Thus, while migration during the period was doubtless 
primarily driven by labour market conditions, family structures may have 
mattered too. The data suggest that, in the face of economic adversity, young 
families were either less likely to leave Ireland, more likely to arrive, or both, 
compared with the rest of the population. Families may be less inclined than 
single people to uproot and leave, though it is possible also that the higher net 
inward migration was partly caused by partners and children relocating to join 
family members who had arrived previously to work.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 The adjustment overestimates the impact of deaths because it employs a linear interpolation based on death rates by 
ten-year age categories in 2009. In reality, the probability of death accelerates with age, so ignoring the acceleration 
slightly widens the gap between the two data series in Figure 2. Hence the assumption is conservative in the present 
context and true net migration lies between the two series. An alternative adjustment employing an approximation of 
the number of deaths derived from the CSO's Life Tables produces an almost identical result.  
Res ea rc h Not es  |  5 5  
 
FIGURE 3.2 Estimated Net Inward Migration by Single Year Cohort, With and Without Adjustment for 
Estimated Death Rate, 2006-2011 
 
 
 
Net Migration by Single Year of Age, 1996-2011 
Greater insight into migration in recent times can be had by performing a similar 
analysis for the three most recent intercensal periods: 1996-2002, 2002-2006, 
2006-2011. This is done in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The changing population profiles in 
Figure 3 show how the peak in the cohort aged around 30 years in 2011 was 
evident in the number of 15 year-olds in 1996, but was made much steeper by 
immigration. The chart also underlines the mobility of those who were relatively 
young workers during the boom. The separation between the lines, mostly 
indicating strong net inward migration, is greatest among this cohort and their 
children.  
 
Nevertheless, this cohort were not always net immigrants. Figure 3.4 replots the 
data as estimated net migration, similarly to Figure 2 above. (The delayed 2001 
Census, postponed to 2002 because of foot-and-mouth disease, necessitates a 
slight presentational change, such that the figures given are average annual net 
migration for each intercensal period.) The cohort who were teenagers in 1996 
had in fact shrunk by 2002, corresponding to net emigration, but then expanded 
dramatically between 2002 and 2006, boosted by a combination of new 
immigrants and returning emigrants. This period included the entry to Ireland's 
labour market in 2004 of workers from the then new EU accession states. It is 
notable that the scale of net inward migration among working-age adults fell 
back considerably during the 2006-2011 period, compared with the 2002-2006 
period, although less so among children.  
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FIGURE 3.3 Population Enumerated in Censuses 1996, 2002, 2006 and 2011, Matched by Single Year Cohort 
(single year of age in 2011) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 Estimated Annual Average Net Inward Migration by Single Year Cohort, 1996-2002, 2002-2006 and 
2006-2011 
 
 
 
Net Migration by Gender, 1996-2011 
The available data make it possible to conduct the same analysis separately by 
gender. Figure 3.5 shows that the most recent intercensal period saw a change in 
the relationship between migration and gender. For the two periods 1996-2002 
and 2002-2006, gender differences were small. Among the cohort aged 27-35 
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years in 2011, marginally more men had left towards the end of their teenage 
years (dotted line) and/or arrived in their early twenties (dashed line), but the 
overall patterns for men and women differed little for the earliest two periods. 
Between 2006 and 2011, however, the pattern altered. Net inward migration 
among working-age men fell substantially, with those in their twenties becoming 
net emigrants. Yet net migration among women changed far less. They remained 
net immigrants at almost all ages, but especially at 25-35 years. Net inward 
migration among women in their early twenties actually increased.  
 
FIGURE 3.5 Annual Average Net Inward Migration by Single Year Cohort and by Gender, 1996-2002, 2002-
2006 and 2006-2011 
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It is not possible with the present data to test hypotheses regarding the cause of 
this differential pattern of migration by gender. Yet the obvious candidates are 
the concentration of job-losses in the construction sector and the tendency for 
family members to come to Ireland to join those immigrant workers who were 
faring well despite the recession.  
 
Net Migration by Ethnicity, 2006-2011 
It seems likely that incentives and disincentives to migrate during the recession 
might differ considerably between the long-term native Irish population and 
more recent arrivals. The published Census 2011 tables permit some insight into 
this issue, because they provide a breakdown of broad ethnicity by five-year age 
groups, allowing cohorts again to be matched between 2006 and 2011.5 The 
Census records ethnicity in three main categories with further subdivisions: 
White (subdivided into Irish, Irish Traveller or Other); Black or Black Irish 
(subdivided into African or Other), Asian or Asian Irish (subdivided into Chinese or 
other); and Other. While ethnicity and immigration history in Ireland are not 
coterminous, they are highly correlated. Figure 3.6 compares the size of 
population subgroups enumerated in 2006 and 2011 for White-Irish, White-Other 
and the four Black and Asian categories combined. (Note that while the results 
for the two White groups are plotted on the same scale, the positive scale for the 
combined Black or Asian group is four times smaller). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 The definition of the population employed in this section is no longer the de facto population, but the population of 
usual residents. Again, this makes only a marginal difference to the analysis.  
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FIGURE 3.6 Estimated Net Inward Migration by Five-Year Age Cohort and Ethnicity, 2006-2011 
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Figure 3.6 reveals a contrasting picture. Members of the long-term native Irish 
population in their twenties in 2011 were substantial net emigrants; especially 
(but far from exclusively) the men. Between 2006 and 2011, almost 40,000 more 
of them left the country than arrived, equivalent to 10 per cent of men and 5 per 
cent of women aged 20-29 years. Note that this does not equate to one-in-ten 
men and one-in-twenty women in this group emigrating during the period, 
because the figures correspond to net migration and are thus reduced by any 
immigration for this cohort. Thus, substantially more than one-in-ten and one-in-
twenty emigrated.  
 
The comparison with the other ethnic groups is striking. New arrivals in the 
White-Other group were overwhelmingly immigrants from Eastern Europe. 
Immigration dominated emigration for this group and for the Black-Asian group. 
Furthermore, the age profile of net migration for these two groups is radically 
different from that for the White-Irish group. Much of the difference is due to 
substantially higher immigration in these groups between 2006 and 2008, rather 
than to the pattern of emigration following recession. However, the latter may 
have played a role too. Although likely to be revised (see footnote 1), the annual 
figures in the Population and Migration Estimates (Central Statistics Office, 2011) 
suggest that Irish nationals accounted for roughly half of net outward migration 
between 2009 and 2011, despite evidence showing that recent immigrants 
experienced higher levels of job loss (Barrett and Kelly, 2012). Considering this 
pattern alongside the large differences by ethnicity apparent in Figure 6, it is 
possible that factors outside the labour market were also important. The family 
situations and expectations of young adults who arrived in Ireland from 
elsewhere during the boom may have been quite different from those of their 
native counterparts. Most non-Irish immigrants to Ireland originate from 
countries with considerably lower per capita incomes and from cultures where 
people are inclined to marry and to have children at a younger age (Lunn and 
Fahey, 2011). Thus, despite their more recent arrival in Ireland, some incentives 
faced by non-Irish immigrants may have made them less inclined to leave than 
young Irish adults.  
 
Conclusions 
Despite the deep recession, for the period 2006 to 2011 as a whole, Ireland 
experienced further net inward migration. Net inward migration was higher 
among those between their late twenties and late thirties, as well as among 
children. In addition to labour market incentives, therefore, family circumstances 
may have been important in migration decisions.  
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From 1996 to 2006, the migration patterns of men and women were similar. In 
contrast, 2006-2011 witnessed a strong gender difference, with net inward 
migration higher among women. One cause was doubtless changed job prospects 
in male dominated industries, especially construction, which boomed in the two 
previous intercensal periods but contracted sharply after 2007 when the property 
bubble burst. But this may not be the only cause. Family members arriving in 
Ireland to join working immigrants who had established themselves may also 
have contributed. 
 
Recent years have seen marked differences too between people of different 
ethnicity. In the White-Irish category, those aged 20-29 were significant net 
emigrants over the five year intercensal period, in contrast to any other age 
group of any other ethnicity. Within this native ethnic group in their twenties, 
more than one-in-ten men and one-in-twenty women emigrated between 2006 
and 2011.  
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The Irish Housing Market 
 
David Duffy and John FitzGerald 
 
Introduction 
The future development of the Irish housing market will play a significant role in 
determining the pattern of the long-term recovery of the Irish economy. While 
the housing market may never return to where it was in the boom years, some 
recovery will eventually take place. The timing of this recovery, including the 
timing of the turnaround in house prices, will play a role in determining when 
output in the economy returns towards its long-term potential. Activity in the 
housing market is influenced by a range of factors including incomes, prices, price 
expectations, interest rates and affordability. It is not possible to forecast when a 
turning point will take place but this note considers evidence on some of the 
variables which might help bring about a stabilisation in the market. 
 
Since 2007 the housing market has collapsed and prices have fallen continually 
since then. This collapse of the housing market reflected the wider recession in 
the economy, in particular rising unemployment and increased uncertainty about 
the future. At least initially, many new dwellings failed to find an owner as they 
were completed. The related rise in the vacancy rate and the consequential 
collapse in prices saw housing completions fall from a peak of over 90,000 to less 
than 10,000 last year. However, over time, the vacant dwellings located in major 
urban areas have been rented out so that, as discussed below, today there are a 
limited number of vacant dwellings in the major urban areas.  
 
With house building almost halted an important question is how much longer 
house prices will continue to fall and where the floor in the market will lie. This 
note does not seek to answer this question: determining the timing of turning 
points in the economic cycle is notoriously difficult. However, a range of recent 
information and research provides useful information in helping to understand 
the factors that might drive the housing market over the next few years. 
 
Although more detail will follow in later publications, the recently released This is 
Ireland: Highlights from Census 2011, Part 1 does offer us some insights into 
Ireland's housing market. It provides information on the stock of dwellings, where 
they are located and the vacancy rate. This affects our understanding of the 
supply of housing in the short to medium term. In addition, the Census data allow 
an examination of the population changes over the last five years, which is also 
useful in understanding the demographic factors that are likely to drive demand 
in the future.  
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Recent work by Kennedy and McQuinn (2012), provides additional useful 
evidence in understanding the working of the housing market. Their finding was 
that house prices are today below their long-run equilibrium. However, as was to 
be expected, their analysis does not tell us when a turning point in the dynamics 
of prices is to be expected. A paper by Kelly (2007), looked at the experience of 
previous house price crashes in other countries. This evidence suggested that 
during a housing bust prices fall by about 10 percentage points each year. Today 
we are five years into the fall in prices and prices are around 50 per cent below 
their peak – roughly what might have been anticipated based on the experience 
in other countries.1 Initially prices may just stabilise. Real Irish house price data 
shows that after the last downturn in real house prices, in the late 1980s, the 
decline was followed by a number of years of stagnant prices, see Figure 4.1. 
Analysis by Bénétrix et al (2011) finds that "...house price slumps can be 
extremely long-lasting once they become entrenched." In addition, they present 
data on 59 house price slumps which show that in the four quarters following the 
slump, in many cases, any house price growth can be moderate. 
 
FIGURE 4.1 Average Real House Price Ireland 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from Dept. of Environment Housing Statistics and CSO Residential Property Price Index. 
 
This paper first considers the factors affecting housing supply, in particular the 
details of the stock of existing housing and its current utilisation. We then 
consider the factors driving housing demand, in particular the potential impact of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), for a comparison of historical real house price declines. 
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demographic change. We then consider the factors affecting households' decision 
to rent or to buy and how this may affect the dynamics of house prices. 
 
Supply of Housing 
An important issue for the recovery of the housing market will be how rapidly the 
absorption of the vacant housing stock takes place. With very few dwellings being 
built today, future demand will initially be met from this fixed supply. With fixed 
supply, regional variations in demand will potentially see regional differences in 
the timing and the nature of any stabilisation. In high demand regions, such as 
Dublin, prices may stabilise before they do so in other regions, where there is an 
excess supply of vacant dwellings. In these latter cases it may take some 
considerable time for the current excess supply to be absorbed. Thus, looking at 
regional vacancy rates and how they are moving is important in understanding 
where the current trend in falling prices is likely to halt first. 
 
The Census estimate of vacant dwellings does not include dwellings under 
construction or derelict properties.2 Using the Census definition of vacant 
dwellings, including holiday homes, almost 290,000 homes were vacant at the 
time the Census was taken in April 2011, giving a national vacancy rate of 14.5 
per cent. Of the vacant dwellings, just over 58 per cent were vacant houses, 21.3 
per cent were vacant flats and 20.5 per cent were holiday homes. 
 
The data in Appendix Table 1 show that the national vacancy rate has not 
changed much since 2006. However, there is significant regional variation. In 
Dublin, Cork, Galway and their environs the vacancy rate has fallen since 2006, 
although it still remains above the 2002 rate. Analysis of the data shows the role 
played by holiday homes in the overall vacancy rate. For example, holiday homes 
accounted for over 48 per cent of the vacant stock in Westmeath in 2011, but just 
0.5 per cent in South Dublin County. While the current economic situation means 
that some people would like to sell their holiday home, most holiday homes will 
not help in meeting the needs of new household formation. The very wide 
regional variation in vacancy rates indicates that, while in Dublin the vacancy rate 
is now closer to what it was in a "normal year", such as 1996, it remains 
exceptionally high in Connaught and the three counties of Ulster. Thus, outside 
the main urban centres, it is likely to be quite some time before new houses will 
need to be built. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 A dwelling was classified as under construction if it was unfit for habitation because the roof, doors, windows or walls 
had not yet been built or installed.  
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It is also important to look at the vacancy rates separately for houses and for 
apartments. Appendix Table 2 shows a low vacancy rate for houses in the Dublin 
region in 2011, down from 9.6 per cent in 2006 to 4.9 per cent in 2011. This 
would be close to the overall vacancy rate (including apartments) for Dublin 
shown in Appendix Table 1 for 1996 and 2002.  
 
The vacancy rate for apartments is high throughout the country. Even in the 
Dublin area there was still quite a high proportion of vacant apartments, though 
still lower than the national average. Of course, the Dublin market is not 
homogenous and there are big variations between city areas in the availability of 
apartments. While a greater vacancy rate may be normal for apartments catering 
for a rental market, the 2011 rates still look high. Thus, there may be less upward 
pressure on rents for apartments, even with an increase in the number of 
households. Certainly outside Dublin vacancy rates for apartments are very high 
and it will be some time before the stock of vacant apartments in high demand 
locations is exhausted. 
 
Tenure 
Traditionally in Ireland the rate of home ownership has been very high. However, 
between 2006 and 2011 there was a dramatic increase in the share of households 
in private rented accommodation (Appendix Table 3). Between 2006 and 2011 
the number of households in Ireland increased by 187,000 or almost 13 per cent, 
to 1,649,000, while the number of households renting increased by 160,000. 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) data suggests that new households 
continued to form even as the market experienced sharp falls in prices over the 
latter half of the period. However, nearly all the net new households formed 
were renting. This is probably due to a number of factors. For example, the 
sudden drop experienced by the housing market from 2007 onwards gave rise to 
the expectation of further house price falls. In addition, affordability has been an 
issue, initially due to high house price levels. In the current period affordability 
would also be affected by income cuts and the need to repay existing debts.  
 
As a result of this change in tenure pattern, according to the 2011 Census, 18.5 
per cent of households were in private rented accommodation, compared with 
9.9 per cent in 2006. The change is particularly marked in the urban areas: for 
example, the proportion in private rented accommodation in Galway city was 
37.5 per cent (up from 24.9 per cent in 2006) and in Dublin city it stood at 32 per 
cent compared to 19.2 per cent in 2006. The effect of the housing crisis on 
households' preferences could see a long-term increase in the share of 
households preferring to rent than to buy. While data are not yet available from 
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the Census for tenure by age, we suspect that the increase in households renting 
is concentrated among households in their late twenties or early thirties. 
 
Age data from Census 2011 shows that the absolute numbers aged 30 years is 
much higher than those aged either 20 or 40 years, see Figure 4.2. In the absence 
of Census micro-data we rely on data from the QNHS to get some insights into 
the characteristics of those who are renting. The QNHS data suggest that a 
majority of those renting are aged under 35 years. In Figure 4.3 it is also 
interesting to note that the number renting private accommodation is generally 
higher by 2011, with those aged 35-44 years increasing from 14.4 per cent in 
2006 to 19 per cent in 2011. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 Population by Year of Age 
 
 
 
Source: CSO, Census 2011. 
 
As discussed above, once the economy recovers and expectations about house 
prices change, it would be anticipated that a proportion of those renting would 
seek to buy a dwelling. A number of key factors will influence this decision, 
including the availability of mortgage finance. Given the impact of the crisis on 
incomes, the ability of households to repay any new mortgage debt will also be 
an important factor. Finally, the depth and duration of the crisis, in addition to 
widespread negative equity means it is possible the crisis will have changed the 
perceived attractiveness of the rental tenure choice. 
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FIGURE 4.3 Numbers Renting by Age Cohort 
 
 
 
Source: Author's estimates using QNHS micro-data. Based on response of family unit head and those not in a family unit. 
 
Whether a household rents or owns a dwelling they still occupy an independent 
dwelling. Thus, a switch in tenure from renting to owning or vice versa need not 
affect the number of dwellings needed to house the population. However, if a 
switch in tenure choice occurs, for whatever reason, it may also be combined 
with a change in preference for type of dwelling. While decisions about housing 
tenure ultimately do not affect the demand for dwellings they may, as a result, 
affect the demand for different types of dwelling. 
 
Demographic Factors Affecting Household Numbers 
Having considered changes in the vacancy rate and the tenure decision of 
households we now turn to the factors affecting the demand for dwellings over 
the next few years. The demand for dwellings in Ireland is affected by a range of 
issues. We first focus on demographic factors. The natural increase in the 
population, affects the number of potential households. Migration, whether 
immigration or emigration, also affects potential household numbers. The final 
"demographic" factor is the timing of the decision by an individual or individuals 
to jointly establish an independent household, which is affected by preferences 
and, of course, by the cost of housing. 
 
In addition to these demographic factors the demand for housing is affected by 
two other drivers: depreciation in the housing stock and the changes in the 
number of vacant dwellings and the number of holiday homes. In this Section we 
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first consider the demographic factors driving household formation and we will 
leave till later the other factors which, together, will determine the total demand 
for dwellings. 
 
We analyse the drivers of household formation using the ESRI's demographic 
model.3 This model forecasts the population by single year of age using 
assumptions about survival rates, birth rates and migration rates. By applying 
age-specific headship rates4, the number of households for each year is derived. 
Here we first use this model to decompose the change in the number of 
households over the period 1991-2011 into the different demographic 
components (Figure 4.4). We then use the model to estimate the future increase 
in household numbers over the next decade based on a set of assumptions about 
migration and assuming unchanged headship rates.5 
 
Figure 4.4 shows this decomposition of new household formation for the inter-
censal periods since 1991. The effect of the very high birth rate up to 1980 shows 
up as a big increase in new households in the period 1996-11. As with earlier 
generations, the children of the 1970s have moved to set up independent 
households as they reach their late twenties. At its peak, the excess of new 
households over households disappearing due to deaths added around 28,000 a 
year to the total stock of households over the period 2002-11. The very high level 
of immigration over the period 2002-6 meant that an additional 17,500 dwellings 
a year were needed to house the inflow of new households. Even with the 
reversal of migration from 2009, the net effect of migration between 2006 and 
2011 was to add 4,900 households a year.6 Thus, the underlying increase in 
demand for housing from demographic factors averaged 45,000 dwellings per 
annum between 2002 and 2006, and 33,200 dwellings per annum between 2006 
and 2011.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 An outline of the model is given in Byrne, Znuderl and FitzGerald (2011). 
4 The proportion of a cohort heading up an independent household. 
5 Over this horizon assumptions about birth rates and death rates make little difference to the numbers. 
6 Duffy (2007), showed that headship rates for immigrants were similar to that for natives. 
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FIGURE 4.4 Demographic Drivers of the Demand for Dwellings7, Thousands per Year 
 
 
 
The Census data also provide some insights into a number of other factors that 
contribute to the demand for housing. Headship rates in Ireland are low by the 
standards of other rich countries in the EU 15. Table 4.1 shows that the number 
of houses per adult is lower in Ireland and Spain than in a sample of other EU-15 
countries such as the Netherlands, Germany or the UK. A comparison of age 
specific headship rates for Ireland, Germany and the UK in Conefrey and 
FitzGerald (2009), shows that this difference arises especially for households in 
their 20s and their 30s. Even with the housing boom of the last decade this 
difference in headship rates remains the case for Ireland. While this could be due 
to different preferences,8 it is more likely to be because of the rapid rise in the 
cost of having an independent household, observed over the period 1991-2006. It 
is interesting that, even with the severe economic difficulties faced by households 
over the period 2006 to 2011, as shown in Figure 4.4 headship rates actually 
increased, resulting in a need for an additional 2,400 dwellings a year. Such a rise 
in headship could be explained by the fall in the cost of renting over that period, 
which made the establishment of an independent household by those in 
employment more affordable than in earlier years. Against that the rise in 
unemployment militated against household formation. As a result, this factor was 
quite minor in driving household numbers. Nonetheless, it is interesting that it 
was positive for the first time since 1996. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 A dwelling refers to a house or apartment. 
8 For example, Irish people may be later to leave home or they may be more prepared to share a dwelling when they 
are not a couple than is the case elsewhere. 
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The difference between the change in the number of dwellings recorded in 
successive Censuses and the change in total number of dwellings built over the 
same period provides an estimate of depreciation, or dwellings which went out of 
use over the same period. Thus, in addition, to the increase in the number of 
households each year, around 9,000 houses a year disappeared from the housing 
stock. This can be explained by a number of factors – redevelopment (e.g. 
Ballymun); conversion of multi-occupation dwellings to single occupation; 
dereliction (e.g. old farmhouses). On top of that, as outlined in Section 2, a 
significant number of houses were built that did not find occupants – they were 
vacant. 
 
For the period 2011-21 we use the demographic model to estimate the potential 
increase in the number of households. The single most important factor is the 
demographic pressure stemming from the natural increase in the population. A 
number of other important assumptions are made in undertaking this work. First, 
and probably most uncertain, is the assumption of significant but limited 
outmigration over the period 2011 to 2015.9 The actual outturn will, inter alia, 
depend on what happens over the coming years in the real economy. Past 
forecasts of migration have proved very unreliable. However, our emigration 
assumption is broadly consistent with what we know about the pattern of 
migration in recent years.  
 
The second simplifying assumption we make is that there will be no change in 
headship over the rest of the decade. This could prove to be a conservative 
assumption given the relatively low headship rates today in the under 35s, the 
dramatic reduction in the cost of housing in recent years and the prospect of 
some recovery in the economy and fall in unemployment over the rest of the 
decade. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions we estimate that there will be some slowdown 
in the "natural increase" in the number of households, reflecting a fall in the birth 
rate in the 1980s. However, it could still give rise to an increase in household 
numbers of between 15,000 and 20,000 a year up to the early years of the next 
decade. Obviously, with higher levels of emigration household formation would 
be slower to increase. The assumption of no change in headship, in other words, 
a constant share of each age group heading up an independent household, and 
assuming a constant rate of obsolescence of 5,000 units per annum (low by 
historic standards), would suggest a need for an additional 20,000 dwellings a 
year over the period to 2016 to house the additional households and an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 It is assumed that net emigration runs at 25,000 a year to 2015 and zero thereafter. 
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additional 25,000 a year in the subsequent five year period.10 To the extent that 
there are vacant dwellings available the need for new dwellings will be reduced. If 
housing costs do not rise rapidly in the coming years, with a recovery in the 
economy and a gradual fall in unemployment, a rise in headship rates could be 
anticipated which would put further pressure on the housing stock in the medium 
term. 
 
TABLE 4.1 Numbers of Dwellings per Thousand Adult Population, 2001 
 
 Total Dwellings Occupied Dwellings 
Denmark 620 595 
Estonia 599 521 
France 634 526 
Germany 599  
Hungary 519 475 
Ireland 2001 467 467 
Ireland 2006 574 478 
Ireland 2011 600 499 
Poland 454 421 
Portugal 633 448 
Spain 655 444 
UK 575 551 
 
Source: Eurostat and Census of Ireland. 
 
With fewer than 10,000 houses a year being built, the anticipated increase in 
household numbers should initially result in some reduction in the number of 
vacant dwellings. However, some regional variations may occur. If, for example, 
the increase happens in the Dublin area, where there are relatively few vacant 
houses, this may require more houses to be built later in the decade. As of today 
the prospect of a rise in house building seems some way in the future. 
 
The User Cost of Housing 
Section 4 explored the potential demand for housing units arising from 
demographic factors. However, a key determinant of whether or not this 
potential demand will be realised are price expectations. In both a housing 
market that is growing dramatically, a bubble, and in a collapsing market, 
expectations about future price changes have a big effect. It is difficult to predict 
the floor in a collapsing market because this will also be determined by 
expectations. Given that so much depends on expectations of households about 
the future, expectations that are difficult to model, it is difficult to predict when 
the market will reach a floor and just how low that floor will be. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 If emigration ran at twice this level this would reduce the increase in household numbers to around 10,000 a year in 
the period to 2016. 
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A useful framework to consider the role of expectations as they affect the 
decision by households to buy a dwelling rather than to rent is provided by Duffy 
(2011). Decisions by households on whether or not to buy a dwelling depend, to a 
significant extent, on whether purchase is likely to be better value than renting in 
the immediate future. As discussed above, there is a large stock of people who 
are renting who are facing this choice today. Central to the decision whether to 
buy or to continue to rent will be expectations of future price changes as these 
determine whether the potential buyer considers themselves to be facing a 
capital gain or capital loss. Even if households believe that, in the long run, prices 
will be stable in real terms, if they believe that prices will fall in the coming year 
then there is a benefit to the household from waiting by avoiding any expected 
capital loss. 
 
FIGURE 4.5 Ratio of the User Cost of Housing Relative to Renting 
 
 
 
The role of expectations as they affect the decision to buy in the coming year 
rather than to rent is reflected in Figure 4.5. Here we use a measure of the user 
cost of housing which includes expectations of changes in capital values. This 
allows the comparison of the annual cost of owning a house to the annual cost of 
renting. The user cost is the notional price an owner-occupier pays for the 
housing services provided by their dwelling, the rate of return or the cost of 
owning a house. The user cost measure takes account of tax, mortgage 
borrowing, maintenance and depreciation costs as well as house price 
expectations. The Figure shows the ratio of the user cost of buying a house 
relative to the cost of renting on the basis of a range of different expectations 
about the change in house prices in the coming year. The dotted green line in 
Figure 4.5 shows the user cost to rent ratio where future house price 
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expectations are assumed to be based on the experience of the previous year. As 
can be seen in the Figure, for much of the period, when house prices were 
increasing high expected house price appreciation meant that the user cost of 
housing was negative, as large capital gains made home acquisition attractive. 
From 2007 onwards the fall in house prices, leading to the expectation of further 
house price falls, reversed this and the user cost to rent ratio rose dramatically, 
peaking in quarter 4, 2009. The extent to which the ratio rose during the housing 
market downturn reflects the capital loss experienced by homeowners.  
 
Since quarter 4, 2009 the ratio has fallen. In our base scenario, where house price 
expectations are assumed to be based on the experience of the previous year, 
the user cost-to-rent ratio gradually moves downwards. However, today, it still 
remains well above the level that would make it profitable to buy unless 
households expect house prices to stabilise or to begin to increase again. The 
solid blue line shows what would happen if expectations suddenly changed so 
that households expected no change in real house prices next year and into the 
future. In that case it would be profitable to switch immediately from renting to 
buying.  
 
This makes for a rather unstable and unpredictable environment. While Kennedy 
and McQuinn (2012) may consider the "fundamentals" of the housing market, 
suggesting that house prices may have fallen too far, because an end to the trend 
of falling prices depends on changed expectations it is much more difficult to 
predict when any turnaround will occur. Of course any change in expectations 
needs to be combined with house prices at affordable levels for those currently 
renting. Census 2011 contains data on the distribution of weekly rents. Assuming 
a 25 year mortgage, a 90 per cent loan-to-value ratio and based on the current 
average interest rate for mortgages, approximately 4.25 per cent, we can 
estimate a house price level consistent with current rental payments. This 
suggests that current house price levels would only allow approximately 40 per 
cent of those renting to buy, and this is on the assumption that they have saved 
the required deposit.  
 
Conclusions 
The recent publication of some details from Census 2011 Census provides us with 
some insights into the current state of the housing market and into some of the 
factors that will determine its path over the next few years. The data suggest 
that, in key urban areas, the stock of vacant houses is not very large. This is 
particularly the case for houses in the greater Dublin area. A significant increase 
in demand to buy houses in these urban locations could exhaust the vacant stock 
and, given a very low level of house-building, this would begin to put upward 
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pressure on prices. In addition, assuming significant emigration until 2015, 
demographic pressures will mean that dwellings will have to be found for a 
minimum of around 15,000 to 20,000 new households each year over the coming 
decade. (If emigration proved higher or lower than this it would clearly affect the 
change in household numbers.) Given the limited stock of vacant dwellings in 
high demand locations, and given the low level of new build, even if there is no 
change in the perceived incentives to buy, the increase in household numbers, 
driven by demographic change, will eventually begin to put upward pressure on 
rents, provided there is not large scale net migration. 
 
The data also show an unusually high proportion of households who are renting 
today – probably because it is more profitable to rent than to buy in a market 
that was seen as over-valued or, now, in a falling market. Should their 
expectation of future prices change there could be quite a number of households 
who would quickly find it profitable to buy rather than to rent though, even then, 
they would need to be convinced that property prices had really stabilised. 
However, it is very difficult to predict when expectations of prices will change. 
While the experience of the crisis may mean that not all of these households will 
look to buy a dwelling in the future, it is expected that a proportion of these 
would seek to buy once their price expectations change. 
 
While property prices may never return to anywhere near where they were in 
real terms in the past, when expectations change it is likely that the recent sharp 
fall in house prices will be halted. This will lead to some increase in the numbers 
of households seeking to buy rather than rent. Whether this demand will 
materialise in practise will depend on the availability of mortgage finance from 
the banking system. In a somewhat longer time scale, there will also probably be 
some pressure to increase the level of building from the current very low level. 
However, such a change would also depend on the availability of finance for 
building. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 Vacancy Rate by County 
 
 1996 2002 2006 2011 
State 8.4 9.8 15.0 14.5 
Leinster 5.5 6.7 11.6 10.3 
Carlow 6.2 7.8 12.3 13.8 
Dublin 4.3 5.0 9.7 8.3 
Dublin City 5.7 6.1 11.7 10.2 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 2.2 2.8 6.2 7.7 
Fingal 3.4 4.9 8.8 7.0 
South Dublin 3.2 4.3 8.9 5.4 
Kildare 3.6 5.8 9.9 8.0 
Kilkenny 6.4 6.6 12.0 11.9 
Laois 7.9 9.0 15.7 12.5 
Longford 10.8 12.8 22.2 21.6 
Louth 6.5 6.4 13.4 12.2 
Meath 6.1 8.2 10.6 8.9 
Offaly 6.9 7.7 12.9 11.8 
Westmeath 8.1 9.7 15.3 13.4 
Wexford 10.6 16.6 21.5 21.0 
Wicklow 8.0 7.2 11.4 9.9 
Munster 10.4 11.5 16.5 16.5 
Clare 12.8 16.1 20.1 21.2 
Cork 9.6 10.4 15.3 14.6 
Cork City 5.7 6.0 12.0 11.1 
Cork County 11.3 12.1 16.5 15.8 
Kerry 17.3 18.5 24.8 26.4 
Limerick 7.9 8.2 12.6 12.3 
Limerick City 6.2 5.6 12.7 12.3 
Limerick County 8.7 9.4 12.6 12.3 
North Tipperary 8.4 10.1 13.4 14.7 
South Tipperary 7.6 7.4 12.7 12.6 
Waterford 9.0 11.5 16.8 16.4 
Waterford City 5.5 7.1 14.3 14.8 
Waterford County 11.7 14.8 18.7 17.6 
Connacht 12.9 15.3 21.4 21.3 
Galway 10.6 12.6 17.9 16.9 
Galway City 6.0 7.7 13.0 11.2 
Galway County 12.5 14.7 20.1 19.4 
Leitrim 18.6 21.7 29.3 30.5 
Mayo 15.8 18.4 24.4 24.7 
Roscommon 12.0 15.4 21.8 23.2 
Sligo 12.4 13.9 23.1 22.2 
Ulster (part of) 13.2 16.7 23.1 24.3 
Cavan 11.2 12.8 21.2 21.6 
Donegal 15.6 20.9 27.0 28.6 
Monaghan 8.9 8.1 12.8 13.6 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 Vacancy Rate by Broad Property Type 
 
 Apartments Houses 
 2006 2011 2006 2011 
 % % % % 
State 19.4 25.2 11.8 13.4 
Leinster 23.9 21.1 13.4 8.4 
Carlow 17.9 41.1 8.2 12.2 
Dublin 18.5 18.6 9.6 4.9 
Dublin City 11.4 19.1 7.0 5.7 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 15.2 20.1 8.6 4.5 
Fingal 25.5 15.5 6.4 5.4 
South Dublin 24.1 17.9 9.7 3.4 
Kildare 20.1 21.6 13.4 6.7 
Kilkenny 39.2 31.8 17.3 11.0 
Laois 38.2 35.5 27.6 11.4 
Longford 30.8 50.5 14.3 20.2 
Louth 20.0 36.7 11.3 10.4 
Meath 24.5 25.9 14.2 7.4 
Offaly 32.7 35.9 16.5 10.7 
Westmeath 29.5 32.9 27.2 11.8 
Wexford 15.5 43.7 12.6 20.2 
Wicklow 26.1 19.4 19.2 9.2 
Munster 25.1 32.2 25.3 15.7 
Clare 25.9 38.2 17.3 20.6 
Cork 24.6 28.4 10.8 13.7 
Cork City 27.3 25.6 19.3 8.0 
Cork County 30.0 31.5 33.6 15.3 
Kerry 23.4 42.2 13.3 26.2 
Limerick 26.8 29.6 10.5 10.7 
Limerick City 18.3 30.8 14.4 7.6 
Limerick County 24.8 27.1 15.2 11.9 
North Tipperary 26.0 35.6 13.9 14.0 
South Tipperary 30.5 33.8 19.1 11.9 
Waterford 30.2 40.5 13.9 14.7 
Waterford City 31.7 42.8 22.9 10.2 
Waterford County 28.6 32.2 27.1 17.6 
Connacht 23.8 35.6 21.4 20.8 
Galway 19.5 27.5 13.3 16.4 
Galway City 32.8 21.6 24.5 8.8 
Galway County 44.7 40.0 40.4 18.9 
Leitrim 35.1 57.0 32.0 29.6 
Mayo 35.4 45.5 27.5 24.1 
Roscommon 35.1 52.8 29.6 22.5 
Sligo 32.2 41.9 29.9 21.4 
Ulster (part of) 31.0 49.5 26.6 23.5 
Cavan 37.2 50.9 37.0 20.3 
Donegal 19.3 53.7 14.4 28.0 
Monaghan 21.9 35.1 17.0 12.5 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 Share of All Households that are in Private Rented Accommodation, % 
 
 2002 2006 2011 
 % % % 
State 11.1 9.9 18.5 
Leinster 11.7 10.8 20.3 
Carlow 10.8 8.8 15.8 
Dublin 14.5 13.8 25.1 
Dublin City 21.0 19.2 32.0 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 11.3 11.1 20.0 
Fingal 8.2 9.5 21.5 
South Dublin 6.6 7.7 16.8 
Kildare 9.2 8.5 17.3 
Kilkenny 7.9 6.9 13.6 
Laois 7.3 6.0 13.2 
Longford 7.1 7.6 16.0 
Louth 9.0 7.0 14.9 
Meath 5.9 5.8 13.7 
Offaly 6.7 6.4 13.6 
Westmeath 10.8 8.8 18.1 
Wexford 8.2 7.6 14.5 
Wicklow 8.2 7.5 14.9 
Munster 10.6 9.1 16.6 
Clare 9.1 7.7 14.2 
Cork 11.8 10.2 18.8 
Cork City 18.4 15.4 27.0 
Cork County 9.1 8.3 16.0 
Kerry 9.2 7.6 14.3 
Limerick 11.8 10.3 17.9 
Limerick City 17.4 14.3 24.3 
Limerick County 9.0 8.5 14.9 
North Tipperary 7.7 6.8 13.1 
South Tipperary 7.8 6.9 13.7 
Waterford 9.9 8.8 14.7 
Waterford City 13.4 12.9 20.1 
Waterford County 7.0 5.5 10.5 
Connacht 10.9 9.8 17.4 
Galway 13.9 12.7 20.9 
Galway City 27.7 24.9 37.5 
Galway County 7.3 6.9 13.3 
Leitrim 7.1 7.0 14.2 
Mayo 9.1 7.6 14.5 
Roscommon 6.8 6.2 13.0 
Sligo 10.4 8.5 16.6 
Ulster (part of) 8.2 6.8 13.5 
Cavan 7.2 7.0 15.1 
Donegal 8.8 6.5 12.9 
Monaghan 7.5 7.3 13.4 
 
 
 
 Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 82.9 2.8 3.4 85.3 5.6 2.8 90.1 4.3 3.1 94.0 
Tourism 3.1 8.5 7.4 3.3 4.3 2.8 3.5 5.2 3.5 3.7 
Other 70.8 7.0 4.8 75.7 6.7 3.8 80.8 5.2 4.0 85.0 
Exports Of Goods and Services 156.8 4.8 4.1 164.3 6.1 3.3 174.3 4.8 3.5 182.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.9 
  
1.0 
  
1.0 
  
1.1 
Adjusted Exports 157.7 4.8 4.1 165.3 6.1 3.3 175.3 4.8 3.5 183.7 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.4 -31.5 -28.2 3.0 -6.5 -4.6 2.8 -1.0 0.0 2.8 
Other Building 5.8 -11.3 -7.6 5.1 -10.1 -10.5 4.6 5.5 3.8 4.9 
Transfer Costs 0.4 -9.3 -4.5 0.4 -8.9 -10.0 0.4 -10.7 -12.0 0.3 
Building and Construction 10.7 -19.6 -16.0 8.6 -8.8 -8.4 7.8 2.4 1.6 8.0 
Machinery and Equipment 7.4 -0.9 -2.0 7.3 4.2 5.0 7.6 6.5 7.5 8.1 
Total Investment 18.1 -11.9 -10.6 15.9 -2.8 -2.7 15.5 4.4 4.3 16.2 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 2.7 9.8 0.3 3.0 3.5 0.1 3.1 4.0 0.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.8 0.3 0.2 69.0 -0.2 -0.1 68.9 0.2 0.1 69.0 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.7 -9.7 -1.6 15.1 12.8 1.9 17.1 5.4 0.9 18.0 
Total Income Received 88.2 -1.3 -1.1 87.1 2.2 1.9 89.1 1.3 1.2 90.2 
Current Transfers 26.5 0.5 0.1 26.6 -2.7 -0.7 25.9 -1.1 -0.3 25.6 
Gross Personal Income 114.7 -0.9 -1.0 113.7 1.1 1.2 114.9 0.8 0.9 115.9 
Direct Personal Taxes 20.8 6.6 1.4 22.2 4.2 0.9 23.1 3.3 0.8 23.9 
Personal Disposable Income 93.9 -2.5 -2.4 91.5 0.3 0.3 91.8 0.1 0.1 91.9 
Consumption 82.6 -1.8 -1.5 81.1 -0.5 -0.4 80.7 1.1 0.9 81.6 
Personal Savings 11.3 -7.9 -0.9 10.4 6.8 0.7 11.1 -7.0 -0.8 10.3 
Savings Ratio 12.0 
  
11.4 
  
12.1 
  
11.3 
Average Personal Tax Rate 18.1 
  
19.5 
  
20.1 
  
20.6 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A4 Public Finances, Exchequer 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
Outcome, €bn Outcome, €bn Outcome, €bn Forecast, €bn Forecast, €bn 
Net Current Expenditure 45.2 47.0 48.0 49.6 49.4 
Net Voted Expenditure 40.3 40.5 41.4 41.0 40.0 
Non-Voted Expenditure 5.0 6.5 6.6 8.6 9.4 
Current Revenue 33.9 34.4 36.8 38.5 40.5 
Tax Revenue 33.0 31.8 34.0 35.5 37.5 
Non-Tax Revenue 0.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 
Current Budget Surplus -11.4 -12.6 -11.2 -11.1 -8.9 
Capital Resources 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 
Capital Expenditure 14.7 8.0 16.5 7.0 7.6 
Capital Expenditure – Voted 6.9 5.9 4.3 3.6 3.0 
Capital Expenditure - Non Voted  7.8 2.0 12.2 3.4 4.6 
Capital Borrowing -13.3 -6.2 -14.0 -5.2 -5.9 
Exchequer Balance -24.6 -18.7 -24.9 -16.0 -14.4 
as % of GDP -15.3 -12.0 -15.9 -10.0 -8.7 
General Government Balance -22.5 -48.6 -20.5 -13.3 -12.5 
as % of GDP -14.0 -31.2 -13.1 -8.3 -7.5 
 
FORECAST TABLE A5 Public Finances, National Accounts 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn 
Total Receipts : Current 51.1 57.7 60.3 56.8 49.7 49.6 50.7 51.4 53.9 
Total Receipts : Capital 4.0 5.6 6.0 3.6 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 
Total Receipts - Current And Capital 55.1 63.2 66.3 60.4 51.7 51.2 52.4 53.0 55.6 
Total Expenditure – Current 45.3 49.9 55.6 60.8 62.7 61.8 60.9 61.3 63.1 
Total Expenditure – Capital 7.2 8.2 10.7 12.8 11.5 38.1 12.1 5.1 4.9 
Total Expenditure - Current And Capital  52.4 58.1 66.2 73.6 74.2 99.8 73.0 66.4 68.0 
General Govt. Balance 2.7 5.2 0.1 -13.2 -22.5 -48.6 -20.5 -13.3 -12.5 
As % of GDP 1.6 2.9 0.1 -7.3 -13.9 -31.2 -13.1 -8.3 -7.5 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A6 Imports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 46.4 5.2 -3.1 48.9 1.6 -0.9 49.6 3.0 2.0 51.1 
Tourism 5.8 -4.9 -6.0 5.5 -6.1 -7.0 5.2 -3.8 -5.0 5.0 
Other Services 75.1 2.2 1.1 76.7 5.1 2.5 80.6 4.5 3.5 84.3 
Imports of Goods and Services 127.4 3.0 -0.7 131.2 3.3 0.9 135.5 3.7 2.6 140.4 
FISM Adjustment 0.5 
  
0.5 
  
0.6 
  
0.6 
Adjusted Imports 127.9 3.0 -0.7 131.7 3.3 0.9 136.0 3.7 2.6 141.0 
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FORECAST TABLE A7 Balance of Payments 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 165.3 175.3 183.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 131.7 136.0 141.0 
Net Factor Payments -32.2 -33.1 -36.0 
Net Transfers -0.9 -1.1 -1.2 
Balance on Current Account 0.1 4.7 5.0 
As a % of GNP 0.1 3.7 3.8 
 
FORECAST TABLE A8 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 85 83 81 81 
Industry 360 342 338 339 
Of which: Construction 120 107 103 102 
Services 1403 1385 1376 1371 
Total at Work 1848 1810 1797 1792 
Unemployed 292 304 315 308 
Labour Force 2140 2114 2112 2100 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.6 14.4 14.9 14.7 
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ESRI Research Bulletin 2012/2/1 
Pharmaceuticals: Getting Better Value for 
Money 
 
Paul K. Gorecki, Anne Nolan, Aoife Brick and Seán Lyons1 
 
The Irish health-care system is under severe budgetary pressure. Pharmaceutical 
expenditure is no exception. During the 2000s Ireland experienced one of the 
highest annual growth rates in pharmaceutical expenditure of any OECD country. 
In 2009 Ireland spent more on pharmaceuticals per capita than any other OECD 
country (with the exception of the US, Canada and Greece). 
 
The onset of the financial crisis has seen a number of austerity budgets, which 
will continue until at least 2015. Public expenditure is being tightened. 
Households, whose incomes are being squeezed, are likely to be asked to make 
greater out-of-pocket contributions towards pharmaceuticals. Budget 2012, for 
example, raised the monthly threshold for the Drug Payment Scheme by €12 to 
€132 and retained the 50c charge per prescription item for medical card patients, 
which was introduced in October 2012. 
 
Nevertheless, significant progress has been made in recent years in reducing the 
cost of delivery of pharmaceuticals in Ireland, both to the Health Services 
Executive (HSE) and the cash paying customer. For example, wholesale margins 
have been reduced and pharmacy mark-ups have declined, at least for 
pharmaceuticals paid for by the state. However, more can and needs to be done 
to take these reforms forward. 
 
The Health Service Executive asked the ESRI to undertake a study of the 
pharmaceutical delivery system with a view to ensuring better value for money, 
while assuring security of supply. The report, Delivery of Pharmaceuticals in 
Ireland. Getting a Bigger Bang for the Buck†, made a wide ranging set of 
recommendations and suggestions on how Ireland can obtain better value for 
money in its pharmaceutical expenditure. These recommendations covered all 
stages in the delivery system from the manufacturer through to the pharmacist 
and the prescriber. In this Research Bulletin some of the major recommendations 
are highlighted. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 paul.gorecki@esri.ie; anne.nolan@esri.ie; aoife.brick@esri.ie; sean.lyons@esri.ie 
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The expiry on 1 March 2012 of the agreement between the state and the Irish 
Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association, which represents the international 
research-based pharmaceutical firms, provides an opportunity to set lower ex-
factory prices for new pharmaceuticals. The ex-factory price is that charged by 
the manufacturer at the factory gate, while new pharmaceuticals are those 
recently introduced pharmaceuticals subject to patent protection with no direct 
competition. The ex-factory price of new pharmaceuticals is currently set as the 
average across a basket of nine EU Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Finland, and Austria. If instead of the 
average the lowest price was used, then the ex-factory would be reduced by 
between 20 to 25 per cent. Other Member States typically use the lowest rather 
than the average price. 
 
The Department of Health is to introduce the Health (Pricing and Supply of 
Medical Goods) Bill later in 2012 which is designed to encourage generic 
substitution and reference pricing. Generic substitution allows the pharmacist to 
select a different, usually lower priced, product from that prescribed. A reference 
price sets for brands of the same pharmaceutical which have been certified as 
interchangeable pharmaceutical products, the ex-factory price for that particular 
group. For high volume interchangeable pharmaceutical products the reference 
price should be set by competitive tendering. The winner of the tender (i.e. the 
lowest priced bid) would set the reference price and supply the market. If the 
prescriber decides to select a different – usually the higher-priced originators –
brand for the patient, then the prescriber would be required to: (i) specify the 
medical reason for their decision; and (ii) write in their own hand 'no substitution' 
on the prescription. This should provide valuable feedback on the 
implementation of generic substitution and reference pricing. 
 
The pharmacy market is marked by a lack of information available to patients on 
not only pharmaceutical prices, mark-ups and dispensing fees, but also the 
services supplied by pharmacists. These services have been expanding with the 
administration of the seasonal influenza vaccine and the dispensing of emergency 
hormonal contraception. In other professions such as dentistry and medicine in 
Ireland, as well as pharmacy in other jurisdictions, patients are provided with 
information that assists them in deciding which provider to choose. Despite the 
marked reluctance of the industry regulator, the Pharmaceutical Society of 
Ireland, the same should apply for pharmacy in Ireland. Dispensing fees, services 
offered and mark-ups should be posted in pharmacies, and pharmacists should 
have the option of using media to disseminate such information. New forms of 
retailing such as the internet should – under the appropriate regulatory 
conditions – be considered by the HSE, perhaps on a trial basis. The result should 
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be a more competitive, efficient and vibrant pharmacy sector that is more 
responsive to patient preferences and needs. 
 
The prescriber, typically the family doctor, acts on the patient's behalf in making 
decisions concerning the appropriate course of treatment in addressing the 
patient's condition. This may involve selection of a pharmaceutical. In writing a 
prescription the international non-proprietary name (INN) – atorvastatin, rather 
than Lipitor, fluoxetine rather than Prozac – should be used by the prescriber. The 
INN identifies the pharmaceutical substance or active pharmaceutical ingredient. 
Each INN is a unique name that is globally recognised and is public property. A 
non-proprietary name is also known as a generic name. INN prescribing is safer as 
it reduces the potential for confusion when prescribing or when seeking to 
identify a pharmaceutical that a patient has been taking. There are likely to be 
exceptions to INN prescribing such as that referred to above in the discussion of 
no-substitution prescriptions. The evidence suggests low levels of INN prescribing 
in Ireland. 
 
In designing ways of achieving better value for money, the recommendations are 
based on evolution, rather than revolution. In part this approach has been driven 
by the observation that variation within health care systems is much greater than 
between them. Thus, by reforming the current model of pharmaceutical delivery, 
better value for money can be realised, while at the same time the costs and 
unintended consequences of large changes can be prevented. This minimises the 
chances that there will be an adverse impact on security of supply. 
 
The recommendations contained in the ESRI report commissioned by the HSE are 
designed to ensure that taxpayers get better value for money from the €1.9 
billion public pharmaceutical budget, but also that the cash paying patients 
benefits too. They are also designed to ensure that patients, irrespective of 
whether or not the state pays for the pharmaceutical, receive safe and effective 
pharmaceuticals without interruption to supply. 
 
†Paul K. Gorecki, Anne Nolan, Aoife Brick and Seán Lyons, Delivery of 
Pharmaceuticals in Ireland. Getting a Bigger Bang for the Buck. Research Series 
Number 24, Dublin: ESRI. January 2012. 
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